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ABSTRACT 
 
Inclusion of human factors in the chemical process quantitative risk analysis (CPQRA) is 
done by use of human reliability analysis (HRA) techniques. Therefore, to avoid under or 
overestimation of the actual risk, human error probability (HEP) estimation must be 
reasonably accurate.  
 
This work was founded on the premise that most HEPs used in CPQRA are plagued with 
uncertainty and therefore do not represent the actual conditions of the system or plant 
being analysed. However, it is critical that the potential human causes for major accidents 
be exhaustively identified and quantified for a complete QRA. There is need to introduce a 
systematic method to analyse the underlying human factors, which cause errors that lead to 
accidents. To achieve this, first a qualitative method to assess human factors was 
developed. It formed basis of introducing the aspects of human factors into quantitative 
risk analysis. An extended framework to capture human and organisation factors that 
influence the operator performance in order to identify the actual error producing 
conditions that lead to basic events has also been described in this work. These factors are 
used to adjust the existing HEPs or the ones that are estimated by experts. 
 
The work was accomplished in the following steps:  
 
i) Development of a qualitative human factors assessment tool. The tool covers 
the whole human factors spectrum and could be used for auditing HF maturity 
level for a given plant. 
ii) Development of a framework to identify human error events and to analyse 
human and organisational factors behind these error events. This information 
is critical in establishing the influence that impacts indirectly yet powerfully the 
probability of an accident. 
iii) Quantification of the human and organisational factors for quantitative risk 
analysis (QRA). An important part is weighting of HF that was done by use of 
a questionnaire sent to industrial representatives. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG (ABSTRACT) 
 
Bei der Durchführung einer quantitativen Risikoanalyse (chemical process quantitative risk 
analysis - CPQRA) verfahrenstechnischer Anlagen kann der Human Factor (HF) durch 
den Ansatz der menschlichen Zuverlässigkeitstechnik (human reliability analysis - HRA) 
berücksichtigt werden. Eine der wichtigsten Aufgaben dabei ist die Bestimmung der 
Wahrscheinlichkeit eines menschlichen Fehlers (human error probability – HEP), um das 
bestehende Risiko korrekt abschätzen zu können. 
 
Das größte Problem dabei besteht jedoch in den starken Unsicherheiten, mit denen diese 
HEPs belegt sind, wodurch nicht die realen Bedingungen der betrachteten Anlage bzw. 
des betrachteten Systems zu Grunde gelegt werden. Es ist jedoch für die Berücksichtigung 
des HF bei der Durchführung einer QRA von grundlegender Bedeutung, dass mögliche 
menschliche Ursachen von Ereignissen und Unfällen umfassend identifiziert und 
quantifiziert werden. Somit wird eine systematische Methode benötigt, mit deren Hilfe 
einzelnen HF- Faktoren, welche zu einem Unfall führen können, analysiert werden 
können. Dafür wurde zunächst eine qualitative Methode, zur Bewertung des Human 
Factors einer verfahrenstechnischen Anlage entwickelt. Diese stellt eine Grundlage für die 
Integration des HF in die Risikoanalyse dar. Es wurde eine umfangreiche Kategorisierung 
aller Faktoren, welche die Leistung des Bedieners beeinflussen, erarbeitet, um die realen 
Bedingungen, welche zu Fehlern führen können zu identifizieren. Diese Faktoren werden 
auch dazu verwendet, die bestehenden HEPs und die von Experten abgeschätzten Werte 
abzugleichen. 
 
Die Arbeit läßt sich in folgende Schritte unterteilen: 
 
i) Entwicklung einer qualitativen HF- Bewertungs- Methode. Diese beinhaltet die 
gesamte Bandbreite des HF und kann angewendet werden, um die HF- Qualität 
einer bestehenden Anlage abzuschätzen. 
ii) Entwicklung einer Kategorisierung um „human error“ Ereignisse zu identifizieren 
und die organisatorischen Faktoren hinter diesen Ereignissen zu analysieren.  
iii) Quantifizierung der einzelnen HF- Faktoren für die quantitative Risikoanalyse. 
Dabei wurde die Gewichtung der Faktoren durch eine ausführliche 
Expertenbefragung vorgenommen. 
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1 BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Accidents in the chemical and petro-chemical industries around the world have resulted 
into major consequences. This includes loss of life, property damage and environmental 
destruction. However, in the last two decades the number of major accidents has 
significantly decreased. This may be attributed to all the innovations and improvements 
realised during this time. But still the cost of accidents in terms of lives, injuries and assets 
remain high. As a result, efforts to reduce the rate of accidents are taking new dimensions 
within the chemical process industry.  
 
Many major accidents have been attributed to human error as a primary cause. Statistics 
show that in the chemical process industries accidents attributed, at least in part, to human 
error range between 60–90% (Joschek, 1981; McCafferty, 1995) and in the petrochemical 
industry e.g. oil refineries where automation is very high, human error accounts up to 50% 
(HSE, 1999). Actually it is evident that the relative number of accident events due to 
human errors is on the rise while those due to technical failures are decreasing. This is 
contributed by two factors. First is that much emphasis has been laid on improvement of 
technical design. Most designers are interested in developing process plants with high 
equipment reliability. Therefore hazards arising from the technical failures dominate risk 
analysis. Yet, safety of a process plant is influenced by the quality of design, operational 
and organisational factors. To improve safety and therefore reduce undesired events 
requires designing of equipment, operations, procedures and work environments in such a 
way that they are compatible with the physical and cognitive capabilities and limitations of 
human beings. It involves identifying unrealistic demands on operators and maintainers by 
system characteristics (Löwe and Kariuki, 2004b). For a plant to be fully developed safety-
wise, significant benefits must be provided to those who operate it. Therefore it is 
important to fully understand all aspects of the facility that influence operator 
performance. The evaluation and assessment of these aspects fall under the human factors 
domain. Technical, management and human factors should closely work together to 
improve performance of a plant. Systems that do not adhere to this are doomed to failure 
because of unjustifiable demands to the facilities and operators that easily lead to unsafe 
situations. Secondly, most of the work on human error focuses on symptoms of human 
error rather than the underlying causes (Vuuren et al., 1997). The percentage range given 
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above (60 – 90%) has evidently a large distribution. This may be explained by uncertainties 
in what constitutes human error. 
 
Some analysts mostly in accident investigation attribute accidents solely to operator error. 
They regard human error as failure of frontline operator to perform an action correctly or 
to omit the action. This approach is not only wrong and naive but also overly simplistic. It 
is like identifying symptoms of a disease without examining the underlying cause or further 
defining the disease. After all it is established that in most systems today, a single cause 
does not lead to an accident.  
 
Literature review shows that a lot of work has been done on human error analysis and 
human error prediction but as mentioned earlier it concentrates on the unsafe behaviour 
of the frontline operator. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) deals with deviation of 
numerical human error probabilities for the use in fault tree analysis (AIChE, 1994). 
Absolute quantification in HRA tends to be biased against the actual source of 
active/direct human error or commonly known as operator error. Moreover, the available 
HRA data is plagued with uncertainties. Unless we understand all these indirect factors 
that lead to direct human error there are slim prospects of reducing accidents or incidents 
caused by operator errors. This calls for a more systematic and comprehensive method for 
identifying the causal sequence of human error event that would enable development of 
sound intervention strategies. 
 
1.2  Scope and objective 
 
This study is founded on the above-mentioned premise that most chemical process 
incidents reports attribute most accidents to human operator. The assumption is that most 
accidents are preventable through individuals; people choosing to behave safely or 
otherwise. There is little interest on the underlying causes of errors that lead to accidents. 
The figure 1-1 shows how the causes of accidents are regarded as opposed to the actual 
situation. Over the years analysis of risks has concentrated on equipment or the technical 
aspects of a system yet this is the least contributor of unwanted events when compared 
with organisation and the operator. 
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Figure 1-1: Importance of accident causation and the current understanding of actual causes 
 
The objectives of this study as a whole are:  
i) To develop a human factors classification and evaluation model. 
ii) To develop a framework to identify human error events and to analyse the 
human and organisational factors behind these error events. This information 
is critical in establishing the influence that impacts indirectly yet powerfully on 
the probability of an accident. 
iii) To quantify the human and organisational factors for quantitative risk analysis 
(QRA). 
 
The study covers largely errors classified as slips and lapses. Acts of sabotage are 
considered out of scope because these involve wilful disregard of laid rules and 
procedures. The data and information used come from the chemical process and petro-
chemical industry. But in some cases, where tasks conditions are thought to be similar data 
from nuclear, aviation and military areas may be used. 
 
Organisation
Operator
Equipment
Importance of major
accidents causation
Current understanding 
in major accidents causation
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2 LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES IN EUROPEAN CHEMICAL 
INDUSTRY 
 
It has been realised that human is the weakest link in a system. Incidents due to human 
contribute significantly to process risk. Therefore a number of laws and guidelines have been 
put in place to try and contain the situation.  
 
2.1 Council Directive 96/82/EC (SEVESO II) 
 
A spell of major industrial accidents in mid-70s e.g. Flixborough (UK in 1974) and Seveso (Italy 
in 1976) led to an increase in societal concerns about the safety of chemical process plants. 
SEVESO Directive 82/501/EEC was issued with the aim of reducing these concerns.  The 
directive was focused on technical measures aimed at reducing the likelihood and the impact of 
low probabilities high consequences (LP-HC) process accidents on people, property and 
environment outside the boundaries of the operating sites.  
 
The continued occurrence of catastrophic chemical process accidents (Bhopal, Basel among 
others) even after SEVESO directive led to a review of the wide belief that LP-HC accidents 
were mainly due to technical failures. This led to a new paradigm, that the prevention of low 
probability high consequence accident requires not only appropriate technical practices but also 
effective management systems because deficient management systems are the root causes of 
most chemical process accidents (ILO, 2001). Based on this background SEVESO II directive 
(Council Directive 96/82/EC) was adopted in 1996. The directive emphasises that the 
operating facility should put in place effective safety management systems as a key measure 
against major accidents (EU, 1996).  
 
In the preamble of SEVESO II directive it is stated that: 
“Whereas analysis of the major accidents reported in the Community indicates that the majority of them are the 
result of managerial and/or organisational shortcomings; whereas it is therefore necessary to lay down at 
Community level basic principles for management systems, which must be suitable for preventing and controlling 
major-accident hazards and limiting the consequences thereof” 
 
SEVESO II was actually the first regulation to introduce checks on the role humans play 
on the chemical process safety. By introducing the role of management in the accident 
prevention loop, the directive recognised that the interaction between humans and the 
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system play a vital role on the overall safety of process plants. Article 9 section 1(a) states 
that member states shall require the operator (operating company) to produce a safety 
report for the purposes of “demonstrating that a major-accident prevention policy and a 
safety management system for implementing it have been put into effect in accordance 
with the information set out in Annex III.” 
 
Annex III: (c) the following issues shall be addressed by the safety management system: 
  
(i) Organisation and personnel - the roles and responsibilities of personnel involved in the 
management of major hazards at all levels in the organisation. The identification of 
training needs for such personnel and the provision of the training so identified. The 
involvement of employees and, where appropriate, subcontractors; 
 
From Annex III the following aspects are notable; organisation, training, safety 
management systems and employees. These as we are going to see in the later chapters are 
core aspects of human factors. Against this background it will be reasonable to conclude 
that SEVESO II directive has laid a solid foundation for inclusion of human factors in 
accident prevention strategies.  
 
The implementation of SEVESO II directive in Germany is done through the “12. 
Verordnung zur Durchführung des Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetzes (Störfall-Verordnung – 12. 
BImSchV)” of 26 April 2000. In this law “necessary safety-relevant precautions to avoid 
false operation”, “suitable operating and safety applications”,  as well as “training of the 
personnel” are explicitly mentioned as required means to prevent major accidents. 
 
An interpretation of this directive is represented as an accident causation and prevention 
model, see Fig 2-1.  
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Figure 2-1: Accident causation and prevention model (Kariuki and Löwe, 2005) 
 
This model is the basis of human factors analysis as required by the directive. Hazards 
identification and evaluation procedures should be applied to all relevant phases of a project 
including incidents arising from technical failure, external events and human factors. This has 
been emphasised by Steinbach (Steinbach, 1999) in the life cycle model of a chemical process. 
The same author has indicated that organisational measures should be applied as a way of 
controlling process deviations. 
 
2.2 Health and safety laws 
 
There are a number of general laws available within the European Union aimed at promoting 
workers health and safety. These laws are not directed at any particular industry and are 
designed to prevent and control minor accidents. The industries that lie out of scope of this law 
are transport, temporary working sites and extraction. They focus on minimising exposure of 
workers to risks caused by physical agents.  
 
i. Council Directive 89/654/EEC 
This general directive concerns the minimum health and safety requirements for the workplace 
to ensure better level of protection of the safety and health of workers.   
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ii. Council Directive 2003/10/EEC 
It covers minimum health and safety regarding the exposure of workers to the risks arising 
from noise. 
 
iii. Council Directive 2002/44/EC 
It covers minimum health and safety regarding the exposure of workers to the risks arising 
from vibrations at workplace. 
 
iv. Council Directive 92/58/EEC 
It is about the minimum requirements for provision of safety and/or health signs at work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2: European council directive on health and safety 
 
There seems to be sufficient laws and regulations aimed at preventing both minor (those 
involving employees at work) and major accidents (those with consequences that go beyond the 
facilities boundaries). Yet, they have not been able to effectively contain the number of 
accidents occurring in the chemical process industry. One explanation would be that there are 
no guidelines on how to implement these laws. Operating companies set up safety management 
systems based on their internal capabilities. 
 
 
 Council Directive 89/391/EEC
Council Directive 
92/58/EEC 
Council Directive 
2002/44/EC 
Council Directive 
89/654/EEC 
Council Directive 
2003/10/EEC 
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3 FUNDAMENTALS OF HUMAN ERROR  
 
3.1 Different views of Human Error 
 
3.1.1 Traditional Safety Engineering View. 
 
Traditional safety engineering is the most commonly used model in the chemical process 
industry (CPI) and most other industries (AIChE, 1994). The approach assumes that human 
error is primarily controllable by the individual (operator), in that people can decide to behave 
safely or otherwise. It focuses on active errors rather than latent conditions. Active errors are 
those that the consequences are noticed immediately an error is committed while latent errors 
take long to manifest themselves. This approach emphasises much on behavioural change 
through motivation (safety campaigns), disciplinary actions and training. It has been widely used 
in the area of occupational safety (1st tier risk) to prevent worker injury. Due to its narrow focus 
it has failed to make an impact as a sufficient technique for analysing human malfunctions in 
the process safety (2nd tier risk) which emphasises on major process accidents.  
 
In addition, the traditional engineering view takes human error the same way an engineering 
component fails. Implying that human error is the likelihood that human fails to provide a 
system function when called upon (Meister, 1966). Human errors are divided into two broad 
groups (Meister, 1977 ; Swain and Guttman, 1983) namely: 
 
Errors of Omission 
- Operator omits the entire task or a step in the task 
Errors of Commission 
- Include errors of selection, sequence, time (too early or too late) and 
qualitative (too much or too little). 
 
The inadequacy of this approach is that it concentrates on the observable consequences of an 
error rather than on its causes. Human error is a consequence not a cause (Reason, 1990) and 
once identified a search for the causes is required. Its focus on behavioural change closes out 
consideration of other causes of error such as inadequate design, procedures, supervision and 
so on. It ignores the underlying error causes or error mechanisms and this means that 
information on error inducing conditions is rarely fed-back to those responsible in developing 
remedial measures. 
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3.1.2 Cognitive View 
 
The main feature of this approach is the assumption that the operators mind can be 
conceptualised as an information processing system. Human beings are not treated in the same 
way as a pump or valve. It emphasises that people impose meaning other than the information 
they receive and their actions are almost always directed to achieving some explicit or implicit 
goals. The major advantage of this perspective is that it provides an effective classification 
system of errors in CPI operations from several points of view. By grouping errors of the same 
type it is possible to develop quantitative database of error frequencies (AIChE, 1994), which 
has been very elusive over the years.  
 
The most commonly used theory in the discussion of psychological precursors of human error 
is Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) (Reason, 1990). This model is based on 
Rasmussen’s Skill-, Rule-, and Knowledge-based (SRK) classification of information processing 
involved in industrial tasks (Rasmussen, 1981; Rasmussen, 1983). This SRK classification 
system is discussed further in (Goodstein et al., 1988), (Sanderson and Harwood, 1988) and 
(Wiegmman and Shapell, 2003). 
 
SRK-based information processing refers to the degree of conscious control by the individual 
over his or her activities. The lowest level is skill-based and mainly applies to mainly automatic 
execution of actions, which there is virtually no conscious monitoring. These actions are feed-
forward and are initiated by a specific event e.g. an alarm or a procedure that prompts the 
operator to actuate a valve. In highly practised operation of valve actuation the execution will 
proceed without conscious thought. This case applies to very many operations in the CPI where 
the operators are highly experienced.  
 
Rule-based level is related to planning and execution of actions. It is similar to skill-based level 
in that it is feed-forward but is governed by internal rules that are activated by “signs”. The 
signs are environmental or situational characteristics that fulfil the conditions for the application 
of the rule; if <condition> then <action>. This means that the characteristics should be made 
to present themselves in the clearest way.  It is mostly applicable in the design of alarms and 
displays.  
 
The knowledge based level is related to planning of the action. It is different from both rule- 
and skill-based levels because it is feedback controlled. In this level the operator carries out a 
Integrating Human Factors into Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis                                           17 
task in an almost completely conscious manner. It is common in situations where the operator 
is a trainee or where an experienced process operator is faced with a completely novel situation. 
The level is activated in problem solving situations that are unique or completely new to an 
operator and for which he has no specific rules available. These situations are mainly found in 
abnormal operating conditions. The operator exerts considerable mental effort to assess the 
situation and therefore the response action would be slower. Also after each control the effects 
are studied before further actions are executed. It is therefore important to minimise tasks that 
calls for this level. The SRK classification is shown in Figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1: The continuum between Conscious and Automatic Behaviour: Adapted from (Reason, 
1990) 
 
3.2 Classification of human errors from the cognitive view 
 
The classification on Figure 3-2 is based on causes of human errors related to SRK-based 
concepts. Mistakes occur by perfect execution of a wrong plan and are therefore very hard to 
diagnose (Groeneweg, 2000). They occur during the planning stage and are characteristically 
present on the rule- and knowledge-based cognitive levels. Ruled-based mistakes could occur, 
for example, when an operator assumes that the reactor is operating perfectly based on 
pressure/temperature indication that is actually faulty. This condition will lead the operator to 
make inappropriate diagnosis. On the other hand, a knowledge-based mistake is lack of 
expertise. Sometimes the operator may be faced with considerably high demands that exert a lot 
of pressure on the information processing capabilities and this affects the performance of the 
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task especially if problem solving from first principles is required. For instance, the operator 
may fail to diagnose the cause of a severe abnormality given time-pressure.  
 
 
Figure 3-2: Classification of Human Errors (Reason, 1990) 
 
Lapses occur as a result of storage failure and are often termed as “forgetting state” or 
“confused state”. They are internal and are associated with memory failure. Lapses occur when 
the situation awareness is blocked (Groeneweg, 2000). Slips on the other hand relate to 
observable actions associated with perceptual or attention failures. Slips have nothing to do with 
the validity of the goals set up for the particular action, they are simply errors committed when 
trying to attain that goal, right or wrong. (Reason, 1990) summarized the classification as 
follows: mistakes are linked to the planning stage, lapses to storage stage and slips to the 
execution stage. 
 
The cognitive classification of errors in CPI is not common and therefore statistics do not exist. 
But looking at the aviation industry it is estimated that 52 % of all errors are “mistakes” while 
lapses and slips contribute to 30% and 10% respectively. SRK-based levels have shown that rule- 
and knowledge based are affected very much by the work environment, which makes it 
reasonable to say that most of the errors are preventable. Lapses are also to some extent 
influenced by the work environment. 
 
In aviation industry, cognitive approach has produced positive results in identification of 
cognitive errors and in turn allows the identification and development of effective intervention 
and mitigation strategies (Wiegmman and Shapell, 2003). The interventions are targeted to the 
pilot (operator) information processing capability. They strive to improve the information 
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processing through improved procedures, training and use of checklists. They furthermore 
facilitate information processing by reducing mental overloads and task demands during both 
normal and upset conditions and thereby reducing potential for errors and accidents. 
 
However, cognitive models are faced by a number of limitations. Firstly, they do not address 
contextual related factors such as equipment design or environmental factors such as 
temperature, noise etc. These models also overlook the effects factors like fatigue, illness or 
motivation affects the operator. Another weakness is the focus on the human information 
processing capability. Consequently, it encourages the view that focuses on the operator as 
being the main cause of errors. This ignores the underlying fact that the operator has little or no 
control over.  
 
3.2.1 Human Factors Engineering View 
 
From this approach operator error is seen as a consequence of mismatch between the demands 
of a task and the physical and mental capabilities of an individual or an operating team. It is also 
referred to as “systems view/approach” and it rarely considers humans as the sole cause of 
error. According to (Heinrich et al., 1980) and (Itoh, 2004), human performance involves a 
complex interaction between several components of system and operator.   
 
(Edwards, 1988) proposed the SHEL model, which describes the components necessary for 
man-machine integration and system design. SHEL is acronym for software, hardware, 
environment and livewire, see Figure 3-3.   
 
 
 
S 
 
H 
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E 
 
Figure 3-3: The SHEL Model (Edwards, 1988) 
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The original SHEL model did not contain management component and this was introduced by 
(Kawano, 2002) and renamed it m-SHEL. Another model was earlier proposed by (Firenze, 
1971), which predicts that system failure occurs when there is a mismatch between the human, 
machine and/or the environment. Therefore as a means to reduce accidents the focus must be 
on the whole system and not only on the operator. 
 
This approach has a clear advantage over the models discussed earlier. It considers a number of 
task-related and contextual factors that affect human performance and these include human-
machine interface design, optimisation of the working environment and workplace/ job design. 
This approach is easier and more practical to adopt for people especially engineers with no 
formal training in psychology or human factors. It has achieved a lot of success in the design of 
new systems. 
 
Nevertheless, it has limitations. Mostly only external causes of errors are taken into 
consideration. Since the model focuses on the interaction between components, much 
emphasis is directed to the design of man-machine interface and anthropometric requirements 
of task and human characteristics. This view may however mislead in a way to believe that all 
errors can be designed out. The internal information processing which leads to errors in the 
area of problem solving and diagnosis can only be covered by cognitive approach (AIChE, 
1994; Wiegmman and Shapell, 2003). The approach also fails to provide a systematic 
framework for addressing underlying causes of errors. Social and organisational factors do not 
receive the weight they deserve as causes of human errors. The following section describes a 
model that is proposed for this work. 
 
3.3 Integrated Human Factors Approach 
 
Due to the limitations of the methods discussed earlier a model that takes into consideration all 
the perspectives of human error is required. Most important is a framework that is able to 
unearth most if not all underlying causes of human error. The model that will be used is a 
detailed accident causation model. It explains how an accident propagates and the factors that 
directly and indirectly influence it.  
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3.3.1 Human Factors Definition and Background 
As indicated in the introduction, statistics show that human failure is a major cause of 
undesired events in process industries. However, the role insufficient design plays towards 
these incident causations and the contributions the management failures have towards 
human error occurrence are not often considered. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Human Factors contribution to undesired events 
 
To sufficiently address human failure a human factors approach is necessary. Human 
factors refer to environmental, organisational and job factors, and human and individual 
characteristics, which influence behaviour at work in a way that can affect health and 
safety (HSE, 1999). It takes human as an integral part of plant design and procurement 
from the earliest stages. Figure 3-4 (Löwe and Kariuki, 2004a) shows that an undesired 
event is as a result of latent conditions and active errors. Latent conditions do not 
immediately affect the functioning of the system but in combination with other factors like 
active operator error and/or a local trigger (high temperature, high pressure) they could 
result to a disaster. Latent conditions are results of less-than-adequate design and 
management decisions.  
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3.3.2 Integrated Human factors Model 
 
Figure 3-5 shows the integrated human factors model. An undesired event is caused by 
equipment failure, human error, external impact (not included in the figure) and a combination 
thereof. These are referred to as direct causes. The science of analysing equipment reliability 
and failures has developed over the years. Many methods are in existence but none will be 
discussed here because they lie outside the scope of this work. 
 
Inadequate design implies that the physical and cognitive capabilities and limitations of 
populations of people are not incorporated into design and operation of a system, process, or 
equipment. In this case technical design refers to human factors engineering/ human 
engineering. This branch of engineering is concerned with designing of products, processes and 
equipment used in manufacturing so as to maximise their ability to be used comfortably, safely 
and effectively by human beings (Chapanis, 1986). Areas that are considered are workplace 
layout, workplace accessibility, controls and displays, workplace environment and labelling and 
signage. These areas are addressed using the human factors engineering approach described 
earlier. Management faults include inadequate training, procedures & procedure development, 
work schedules, staffing, shifts & overtime among others. From Figure 3-5 it can be seen that 
management faults influence equipment failure, human factors engineering and operator 
characteristics to some extent. An organisation, through formulation of policies and safety 
culture has also a direct influence on the way a company manages its safety systems. This also 
affects the performance of the operator.  
 
Organisation, management systems and facility design, when inadequate, are the causes of latent 
conditions (Reason, 1990). Latent conditions do not immediately affect the functioning of the 
system but in combination with other factors like active operator error and/or a local trigger 
(high temperature, high pressure) they could result to a disaster. On the other hand active errors 
manifest themselves immediately they are committed. If not recovered they could lead to 
undesired events (accidents or near-miss). Active errors could be analysed using the cognitive 
approach. Equipment failures can be analysed through plant condition or maintenance and 
inspection management. 
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Figure 3-5: Integrated Human Factors Model (Kariuki and Löwe, 2006) 
 
3.4 Accidents Attributed to Human Errors 
 
Most of the major accidents that have occurred over the years have put blame on human error. 
It is without doubt that human is the biggest contributor of unwanted event. (Turner, 1978) 
described human as the weakest link in any engineering system. This is due to the fact that all 
engineering systems rely on human intervention to some extent. Expert systems which handle a 
wide variety of situations without operator interventions have been on a continuous 
development. These will however take a long time before they can be totally relied upon . 
 
Some of the tasks that require continuous operator intervention or participation include 
sequential control, starting of pumps, motors, mainly in batch processes; monitoring the proper 
operation e.g. watching a filling process; alarm response and diagnosis of unusual system 
condition (Kandel and Avni, 1988). The accidents described here demonstrate that human error 
is not only those operator intervention actions but a series of failures that remain dormant until 
the time they get activated by a local trigger e.g. a rise in pressure or temperature. But it should 
not be misunderstood that immediate causes (due to operator) are less important than the 
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underlying causes. Immediate causes can only help prevent a previous accident from happening 
again but underlying accidents may prevent similar accidents (Kletz, 2001). 
 
3.4.1 Piper Alpha 
 
Piper Alpha disaster remains one of the biggest tragedies of the modern times. The 
disaster happened on 6th July 1988 and claimed 167 deaths. Without deep analysis the 
disaster could be attributed to “human error” due to the fact that a critical redundant 
pump had been switched off for repair. Piper Alpha disaster is a perfect example of how 
lethal human and organisational factors can be.  
 
Risk analyses in offshore structures often focus on structural and equipment reliability 
(Pate-Cornell, 1993). The soft aspects of safety management which include human factors 
are not given the weight they deserve. After the investigations of Piper Alpha it was 
discovered that the pump that had been turned off was a failure of “permit-to-work” 
system that did not ensure proper communication. This is one of the chronic problems 
that lead to series of undesired events on the platform. This accident will be analysed with 
special emphasis on human and organisational failures that affected the initiating events.   
 
The accident started with a process disturbance. Condensate pump “B” tripped and the 
redundant pump “A” was shut down for maintenance. It happened that in the morning 
shift the pump “A” was out of service to enable change of a pressure valve. This job had 
not been completed by the morning shift and was pending for the next day. A blind flange 
was put in place of the pressure valve.  A serious communication failure occurred and the 
night shift was not informed. Investigations revealed that permit-to-work system had 
failed. Actually two work permits had been produced for the same pump; one from the 
supervisor for routine maintenance and the other by shift engineer for the PSV 504 
(Cullen, 1990).  
 
After pump “B” tripped immediate efforts to restart it began in order not to loose 
production. The pump failed to restart and therefore the redundant pump “A” became the 
main point of focus. The night shift engineer found a permit-to-work for the routine 
maintenance but not that of the pressure valve. The routine maintenance had not begun 
according to the permit-to-work. This gave a green light to restart pump “A”. No one 
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noted the missing pressure valve. The pressure valve location was 15ft high and was 
actually obstructed.  
 
After pump “A” was restarted about 45kg of condensate were released but went 
unnoticed. Had they been detected then ignition and subsequent explosions could have 
been prevented. There were reported cases of false alarms that lead the operator to ignore 
the critical ones. Monitoring panels in the control room were also found to be 
inadequately designed. Another thing that could have lead to failure of this early detection 
is lack of training of the operators on how to handle abnormal conditions.  
 
Prior to the first explosion, gas alarms were received in the main control room but because 
of the less-than-adequate design of the detector module rack, the operator did not check 
where they came from.  
 
The propagation of events after the explosion involved general layout, tight spaces and 
insufficient fire and blast protection. Several factors contributed to the failure of fire 
fighting capabilities. The automatic deluge system had been switched off by divers. The 
manual system was located in areas vulnerable to fires and blasts and therefore did not 
survive the first explosion.  There were no redundancies elsewhere. There was only one 
evacuation route and when this was engulfed by fire the exercise was literally made 
impossible. 
 
The following human factors can be pointed out from this accident: 
 
Communication: The change of shift was not systematically done. There was failure of 
communication when writing work-to-permits (two were produced for the same pump). 
 
Supervision: The blind flange that was installed in place of pressure valve was not made leak-
tight. Therefore it could not stand the high pressures. There was no inspection after fitting 
and this could have led to early leaks. 
 
Accessibility: The location of the pressure valve was out of sight for the night shift people. 
When designing such a critical component then it should not lie beyond reach for the 
maintainer or operator. The design of manual fire fighting systems also failed to follow the 
accessibility guidelines. 
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Alarm design: There were very many non-critical alarms that lead the control operators to 
ignore the series of alarms after the first explosion. There are guidelines for designing 
alarms, see PRISM guidelines (PRISM, 2004).  
 
Training: Operators were not trained on upset conditions. 
 
Display design: In the control room the monitoring panels were not clearly visible and one 
could not easily tell where the alarms originated from. 
 
3.4.2 Texaco Incident 
 
An explosion, followed by a number of fires, occurred on 24th July 1994 at the Texaco oil 
refinery, Pembroke, Wales.  Twenty tonnes of hydrocarbon were released and exploded 
when a slug of liquid was sent through the flare system. There were 26 injuries and 
reinstating costs were estimated to 48 million British pounds. There were no fatalities but 
this was because it was on Sunday. The investigations were carried out by Health & Safety 
Executive (HSE). 
 
The incident started at around 0900hrs when hydrocarbon flow was lost to the de-
ethanizer Figure 3-5 shows a simplified schema of the relevant part to describe this 
incident (Dykes, 1997). This caused the liquid in the de-ethanizer to empty into the 
debutanizer and the overhead accumulator vessel. To prevent the total loss of liquid from 
the de-ethanizer Valve A closed and this was according to the design. When valve A closed 
it caused a low volume on the de-butanizer and this led to the automatic closure of valve 
B. The hydrocarbon on the de-butanizer was now blocked-in.  
 
The hydrocarbon in the de-butanizer was still subject to heating. The temperature and 
pressure rose leading to the opening of the pressure relief valve and the de-butinizer to 
vent. Thereafter the liquid level in the de-ethanizer was restored and so valve A opened 
and flow restored to de-butanizer. This should have caused Valve B to open and allow 
flow of hydrocarbon out of the already pressurised de-butanizer to naphtha splitter. But 
valve B remained closed while the display to the operator showed that the valve was 
actually open. The display did not show the global presentation of the process and 
therefore the operator could not tell whether or not there was hydrocarbon flow to the 
naphtha splitter.  
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Figure 3-6: Simplified schema for the Texaco plant. Adapted from (Dykes, 1997) 
 
When the operator noticed that the pressure was still building on the de-butanizer he 
opened valve C to provide another route out of the vessel. This resulted in a high liquid 
level in the flare stack knock out drum. Due to a previous modification, there was no 
facility to pump out the knock-out drum quickly.  
 
By the time the operators concentrated on the problems on the de-ethanizer and de-
butanizer, they were interrupted and confused by the number of alarms being generated.  
 
The combination of high liquid level in the knock-out drum and the de-butanizer venting 
into the flare system again, caused a slug of liquid to be carried through the knock-out 
drum and into the flare, which collapsed at the weak point. 
 
Human factors lessons from this accident could be summarised as follows:  
 
Alarm System: It was discovered that 87 % of the 2040 alarms were classified as high 
priority despite being only informative. These turned out to be nuisance alarms especially 
during upset conditions. Safety critical alarms should have been a number that the 
operator could handle. 
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Display: The display did not give a complete overview of the process to help the operator 
easily diagnose the root cause of the problem.  
 
Training and competence: The operators were not trained to check on simple mass and 
volumetric balances whenever flow or level problems were experienced. There was also no 
guidance on how to handle emergency conditions and when to initiate shutdowns. In this 
case operations continued when on the contrary shutdown should have been initiated. 
 
3.4.2.1 Hoechst Accident  
 
This happened in 1993. The incident happened when o-nitrochlorobenzene (o-NCB) was 
converted with methanol and sodium hydroxide to form an intermediate o-nitroanisole (o-
NA) for other reactions. This reaction normally takes place in a stirred tank semi-batch 
reactor. First o-NCB and methanol are fed into the reactor then the stirrer is started and 
cold methanolic sodium hydroxide is dosed into the reactor. The reaction is exothermic 
and when the temperature reached 90oC the cooling system is activated to retain the 
reaction at a constant temperature for the rest of the reaction. The dosing process takes 5 
hours and the reaction is completed after 2 more hours of stirring.  
 
The 1993 incident happened due to three failures. The stirrer was not started from the 
beginning and this lead to accumulation of reactants in the reactor in two non-mixed 
phases. Since no reaction was taking place there was no increase in temperature observed. 
This prompted the operator to use steam to heat the reactor to reach the required reaction 
temperatures of 90oC. Only then did the operator realise that the stirrer was off and 
switched it on immediately.  
 
The reaction started immediately and a lot of heat reaction was generated. The cooling 
system could not remove all of it. At 160oC and 16bar two safety valves opened and the 
reactants were discharged to the atmosphere through the roof. Part of the products 
discharged was 28% toxic o-NA.  
 
From this incident the following human factor relevant issues could be pointed out.  
Control and displays: Task analysis could have helped to identify that the stirring task was 
critical. Due to the nature of the task (it is performed at a skill-based level) it was possible 
to deduce that an operator could easily experience a memory lapse once in a while. An 
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interlock to block dosage when the stirrer fails or an alarm to alert the operator would 
have been a viable solution. 
 
Training: The operator did not have basic training on reaction chemistry. This is the reason 
why he opted to heat the reactor with steam. Training on reaction chemistry would have 
helped in trouble shooting. 
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4 CHEMICAL PROCESS QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS METHODS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Serious accidents are viewed as the culmination of a sequence of failures involving human, 
hardware or both. It is worth noting that accidents can never be prevented entirely or 
eliminated. It is often important to reduce their frequencies. A necessary first step in such 
a risk reduction effort is to be aware of the risks associated with the system in the first 
place. Chemical process quantitative risk analysis (CPQRA) was developed to facilitate the 
quantification of risks associated with the complex engineered systems.  
 
This method has been used in high-hazard industries. Its aim is to estimate and quantify 
risks originating from a hazardous industrial activity to individuals and groups inside or 
outside the boundary of the plant. It is a probabilistic methodology which has its roots in 
the nuclear, aerospace and electronic industries. In the nuclear and aerospace industries it 
is commonly referred to as Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). The basis of CPQRA is to 
identify incident scenarios and evaluate the risk by defining the probability of failure, the 
probability of consequences and the potential impact of those consequences.  
 
CPQRA is performed on a company’s own initiative and because of the requirement from 
authorities. One of the regulations that have promoted its use is the Seveso II directive. In 
the Netherlands it is compulsory to quantify risks as part of an application for operational 
licences. The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) has adopted QRA as an approach 
to verify that the risk acceptance criteria are met (Nielsen et al., 1996; NPD, 1992). In the 
UK, high-risk companies are required to provide safety cases similar to CPQRA. This 
provision is through the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulation (COMAH) of 
1999. It can be said that CPQRA has been accepted in a number of countries in the EU 
for preparing statements about total risk from an industrial activity. Exceptions are in 
Germany and Denmark where a deterministic approach is used. CPQRA is only accepted 
as supporting evidence when choices are to be made amongst different safety solutions 
(Einarsson, 1999).  
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4.2 General Approach of CPQRA  
 
Quantitative Risk Analyses are achieved in four broad steps which are hierarchical in 
nature. These are: Hazard identification, consequences quantification, frequency 
quantification and risk estimation. The steps are used for structuring the vast quantities of 
information that go into risk analysis. Quantification will only be possible when a variety 
of different types of data are available. These include 
 
a) Components failure rate data 
b) Common cause failure data 
c) Human action data 
d) External events data 
 
The summarised procedures for a CPQRA are illustrated in fig. 4-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Steps for a Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis 
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4.2.1 CPQRA Definition 
QRA identifies those areas where operation, engineering, or management systems may be 
modified to reduce risk and may identify the most economical way to do it. Therefore, 
since a complete CPQRA may not always be necessary or feasible on every system, a scope 
has to be defined in order to satisfy practical budgets, schedules and the defined goals.  
4.2.1.1 Depth of the study 
The depth of the CPQRA is defined using a “study cube” (AIChE, 2000). The cube 
contains three axes representing. Risk estimation technique, complexity of analyses and 
number of incidents selected (fig 4-2).  
 
 
Figure 4-2: The Study Cube (AIChE, 2000) 
 
Risk estimation technique is defined by the nature of results desired during the study. 
Estimation by consequence, frequency and risk represents the level of maturity of these 
techniques. Consequence estimation is well understood because it is represented by 
models like discharge, toxic effect and dispersion calculations. Frequency estimation is 
more difficult especially where historical data does not exist. Techniques like fault tree 
analysis and event trees are used to develop such data, but these models are not mature 
like those for consequences estimation. The technique being developed in this work is 
applicable during frequency estimation. Risk estimation requires understanding of the 
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demographic distribution at consequence effect zone in case of an accident.  It also 
requires wind flow characteristics and therefore risk estimation with low uncertainty is 
hard to achieve. 
 
Complexity of the study is defined by the complexity of the models used and the number 
of incident outcome cases. Study models range from, for example,  a simple unidirectional 
single speed wind to multi-directional, variable speeds with different atmospheric 
stabilities. Incident outcomes are cases that have potential impact on the population. 
Therefore the more cases considered the more complex is the study.  
 
On the study cube the number of incident cases is represented by bounding group, 
representative set and expansive list. Bounding group is concerned with small number of 
incidents which are potentially catastrophic and usually referred to as worst cases. They 
would include, for instance, large toxic release or large explosions that affect a large 
(offsite) zone. Representative set contains some incidents which are potentially 
catastrophic and some that could be defined as major. Major incidents have a medium 
effect zone and are limited to site boundaries. Expansive list contains all incidents that 
have potentially small, major and catastrophic effects.   
 
The depth of CPQRA proceeds across the diagonal of the cube. Simple/consequence is 
useful for screening purposes. Intermediate/frequency CPQRA is applicable when the 
design is substantially developed. The maximum benefit is achieved from the basic design 
phase of an engineering project. Here the frequencies are estimated and modified if 
necessary. In the complex/risk CPQRA all necessary information on the plant is available. 
It is possible to achieve this CPQRA only after the detailed design is available. Integration 
of human factors into CPQRA will produce best results when applied in the 
intermediate/frequency and complex/risk. This is because it would be possible to carry 
out compressive task analyses during basic design and detailed design phases. 
 
4.2.2 System Description 
This involves compilation of the process or plant information necessary for risk analysis.  
It covers all relevant design and operational information, which include; piping and 
instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), process flow diagrams, operating and maintenance 
procedures as well as emergency operating procedures and  properties of the material 
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being processed among others. Also necessary is the site location and layout, population 
distribution in the surroundings and weather data.  
 
4.2.3 Hazards Identification 
This step involves incident identification, enumeration and selection. The aim of this step 
is to obtain a general view of potential hazards, to find relevant subsystems for detailed 
analysis and to obtain a detailed view of hazards and factors contributing to them. As 
mentioned in section 4.2.1.1 the incidents are screened based on the aim of the study. It is 
worthy to mention here that representative set is most of the time sufficient for risk 
estimation to the public. Many tools for this step are available and they include DOW 
index, checklists, hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies, failure mode and effect analysis 
(FMEA) and preliminary hazard analysis (PHA). A detailed review of these techniques is 
found in hazard evaluation procedures guidelines (AIChE, 1992). 
 
4.2.4 Accidents Modelling 
Accidents are modelled to gain a deeper understanding of potentially serious accidents and 
obtain a basis for quantification of accident frequencies. Fault tree and event tree analysis 
are the most commonly applied techniques used for this purpose. In this step initiating 
events are identified together with corresponding intermediate events and basic events.  
 
4.2.5 Consequence Estimation 
The basis of consequence analysis is the loss of containment of hazardous material. The 
material is hazardous based on the energy stored and toxic properties. Important models 
used for consequence estimation are discharge, dispersion and toxic effect calculations. 
Examples consequences of interest during risk analysis are boiling liquid expanding vapour 
explosion (BLEVE) and unconfined vapour cloud explosion (UVCE). 
 
4.2.6 Frequency Estimation 
Frequency estimation could either be modelled or acquired from historical data. Where 
historical data is applied the failure rates for components are used. Detailed frequency 
modelling is not necessary here and therefore could be used at the initial phases of design 
when plant systems and safeguards are not well defined. An important source of failure 
rates for the petro-chemical industry is Offshore Reliability Data Handbook (OREDA, 
2002). Modelling of frequencies is achieved by use of fault trees and event trees. The 
relation between the two is illustrated in figure 4-3. The inclusion of human factors in risk 
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analysis, which is the main aim of this work, is at the basic events of the fault tree analysis.   
This is also shown in the same figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Relation between Fault tree analysis and Event tree analysis 
 
4.2.7 Risk Estimation 
To estimate risk individual and societal risk approaches are normally applied. Individual 
risk represents the likelihood of fatality at a particular effect zone. It assumes that each 
individual on that area has the same chance of being affected. It is commonly represented 
by contour plots. Societal risk on the other hand estimates the number of people killed by 
each incident outcome. F-N graphs or curves  are common way of representing this type 
of risks. While estimating risks it is important to know wind distribution directions. 
 
More on QRA/ PRA could be found in the following references: (AIChE, 2000; Bley et 
al., 1992; NASA, 2002; NUREG, 1983) 
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4.3 Human Reliability Analysis for Quantitative Risk Analysis 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
Human reliability was described as the probability that a person a) correctly performs an 
action required by the system within the required time and b) that he does not perform any 
extraneous act that could degrade the system (Swain and Guttman, 1983). There have been 
other qualitative definitions e.g. the ability of humans to adapt to changing conditions in 
disturbances (Hacker, 1998). Methods used to assess human reliability are known as 
human reliability analysis (Swain, 1990). In carrying out HRA it is necessary to identify 
those tasks that can have effect on system safety and reliability. 
 
HRA can involve both qualitative and quantitative approaches. In the qualitative approach 
the human actions are modelled; tasks are analysed and the possible sources of errors 
identified. In the latter the human error probabilities (HEPs) are assessed and 
quantification of certain factors is made and this is the most applicable within the QRA 
framework. There are methods existing for both approaches. Some of them will be 
discussed here to investigate to what extent they can be applied to investigate human 
factors. 
 
The central tenet of HRA is that HEP estimation must be reasonably accurate (Kirwan, 
1996). This is important to avoid under / overestimation of the actual risk.  HRA 
techniques fall under two categories, those that use a database and those that use expert 
opinion. The database approach uses a collection of generic HEP that need to be modified 
to fit the system specific probabilities. This is the main concern of current work. There are 
many factors that influence the occurrence of human error. Modification of these HEP 
has mainly been done by trying to consider the context-related Performance Influencing 
Factors apparent in the scenario being analysed. This is done in a rather unstructured way.  
 
The drawbacks of the current HRA related to this study could be summarised as follows:  
◊ HRA methodologies are not able to identify various causes of human errors. The 
observable results of human actions are the main point of focus (Dougherty, 
1990). 
◊ Inadequacy of data for human error analysis (Hollnagel, 1998). 
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◊ Effects of organisational, managerial and safety cultures are not adequately 
considered in HRA (Hirschberg and Dang, 1996). 
◊ Several methods or models for incorporating human and organizational factors in 
quantitative risk analyses are described in the literature, like Manager (Pitblado et 
al., 1990), MACHINE (Embrey, 1992), I-RISK (Bellamy et al., 1999), and 
ARAMIS (Hourtolou and Salvi, 2004). None of these methods seems to be 
regularly applied by the industry. 
 
4.3.2 Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
 
This is the most known and widely used applied technique to perform HRA. It is 
described in extensive details in (Swain and Guttman, 1983). THERP is a method for 
predicting HEPs and evaluating the degradation of a man-machine system likely to be 
caused by human errors, alone or in connection with relevant system characteristics. It is a 
decomposition technique. The process is as follows: 
 
◊ Decomposition of tasks into elements. 
◊ Assigning nominal HEPs to each element. 
◊ Estimation of effects of performance influencing/shaping factors (PIFs/ PSFs) on 
each element. 
◊ Modelling in an HRA event tree 
◊ Quantification of total task HEP 
 
In the decomposition, tasks are split into sub-tasks. This is because particular tasks may 
require, for instance, seven operations by more that one operator located at different 
positions.  The task in this case will be decomposed into seven elements and the procedure 
to undertake such a decomposition is described in the HRA handbook (Swain and 
Guttman, 1983).  
 
After tasks are sub-divided into subtasks (tasks elements) nominal HEPS are assigned. The 
THERP Handbook has a set of tables with different human error probabilities for various 
tasks. The problem occurs when a task does not appear on the available tables. This can be 
a major reason for occurrence of “outliers” which is task types which are beyond the 
technique’s ability (Kirwan, 1996).  
 
Integrating Human Factors into Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis                                           38 
The determination of the effects of PSFs occurs based on the assessor’s qualitative 
analyses of the scenario. A wide range of PSFs have been given by the same handbook. 
They include procedures, training, stress, distractions and operator experience among 
others. The assessor uses a multiplier on nominal HEP. This is usually derived from the 
error factors (EF) associated with each HEP. EF expresses the uncertainty about the real 
value of HEP. It is the ratio between the 95th percentile upper bound of the log-normal 
probability density function and the median (or ratio between the median and the 5% - 
lower bound).  
 
 THERP models depend on different tasks. For instance, a series of identical knobs are to 
be adjusted to the same set-point. If an operator mistakenly sets the first knob to a wrong 
point, then the probability that all others are set to the same wrong set-point increases. 
Models of dependence levels are found in the same handbook. Failing to consider 
dependence could have dramatic effects on HEPs.   
 
A HRA event tree, see Figure 4-1, is used to model HEPs. It represents a binary decision 
process, that is, success or failure in task performance as the only possibilities.  
 
Figure 4-4: HRA event tree. Adapted from (Swain and Guttman, 1983) 
 
Integrating Human Factors into Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis                                           39 
The success and failure probability outcomes add up to unity. By using the event tree it is 
also possible to explicitly show the recovery paths of the errors that are recoverable. 
 
The description above is a brief introduction of THERP. It is not the intention of the 
author to go into extensive depth because this is available in the THERP handbook. This 
introductory part is to show that THERP is a powerful technique for modelling HRA but 
has limitations to be applied in context of the present work. The main limitation of 
THERP is that the PSF process is relatively unstructured and highly judgmental based on 
the assessor’s experience.  In addition there has been a tendency to use stress and time as 
the only PSFs influencing HEPs. This could be attributed to lack of systematic PSFs 
analysis and quantification tool. Furthermore, the interaction between certain PSFs is yet 
unknown, therefore no guidelines can be given for possible combinations. When 
developing human factors quantification tool, this fact will be taken into consideration as a 
weakness of THERP. THERP also lays special emphasis on nuclear power plants and 
some of the conditions are not similar to those of chemical process plants. 
 
4.3.3 Success Likelihood Index Method 
 
The success likelihood index method (SLIM) is a technique that uses expert judgment to 
develop HEPs. Its premise is that the probability of error associated with a task or a task 
step is a function of the PIFs in the situation (Embrey et al., 1984). The SLIM procedure 
numerically rates the PIFs which influence the probability of error, and these ratings are 
combined for each task to give an index called success likelihood index (SLI).  This index 
is then converted to a probability by means of a general relation between the SLI and 
calibration tasks (AIChE, 1994).   
4.3.3.1 Steps of the SLI Procedure 
 
The calculation of SLI takes place in five distinct steps:  
 
Step 1: Modelling and specification of PIFs 
Here tasks are evaluated by judges to try to identify the errors of omission 
and/commission that could occur. Then PIFs that could have significant effects on these 
error modes are determined.  As an example judges may decide that PIFs influencing 
success in the task being evaluated are:  
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◊ Time Stress 
◊ Procedures 
◊ Experience 
◊ Quality of information 
 
Step 2: Weighting the PIFs 
In the original SLIM a simple multi-attribute rating technique (SMART) was used to 
estimate weights (Embrey, 1983). Judges are asked to decide which single PIF would have 
the most significant effect on enhancing the probability of success if it were improved. 
This is assigned a weight of 100. The PIF which is viewed as the next most significant on 
success is then chosen and a weight relative to the most significant PIF is assigned to it. It 
acquires a weight of 50 if the judges feel it is half as important as the first one. This is 
repeated for all the PIFs. Then the weights are normalised and they represent the relative 
importance of each PIF in terms of how strongly it influences the likelihood of success.  
 
Step 3: Rating the Task 
Ratings represent the expert opinions’ regarding the actual situation for the tasks being 
assessed. The rating is by directly assigning a numerical value to each PSF on a scale of 0–
100. If for example procedures are assigned a rating of 50, then that signifies the industry 
average. 
 
Step 4: Calculating SLIs 
The index is calculated by forming the product of the normalised weights and the ratings 
for each PIF and summing them up. This means that SLI could take any value from 0 to 
100, where 0 indicates that the task has a high probability of failing and 100 a high 
probability of success. The SLI is converted into HEP by the use of the formula: 
 
log HEP = aSLI + b       (4.1) 
 
The constants a and b are calculated by applying this formula to tasks with known HEPs. 
SLI for the tasks with known HEPs is obtained using the same procedure described 
above. 
There are limitations associated with SLIM:  
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a) The weighting method uses one pivot PIF. All other PIFs are weighted in 
comparison to this particular PIF. It does not take into consideration the 
interaction between all PIFs being analysed.  
b) There exists no guideline on how to give ratings. It solely depends on the 
assessors’ knowledge and experience. 
c) SLIM has the strength in analysing PIFs with direct influence on errors. 
These are procedures, training, time stress etc. but fail to address the higher 
levels like management.  
d) There are inherent theoretical weaknesses associated with the calibration 
equation (Vestrucci, 1988).  
4.3.3.2  Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) 
 
CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998) is classified as the second generation of HRA. It identifies tasks 
or parts of work that are affected by variation in human cognition. Then it determines the 
conditions under which the reliability of cognition may be reduced, and where therefore 
these tasks or actions may constitute a source of risk. The method also provides an 
appraisal of the consequences of human performance on system safety which can be used 
in a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). CREAM is based on a category of eight error modes. 
These are: 
 
Timing: too early too late 
Duration: too long too short 
Sequence: Reversal, repetition, commission, intrusion 
Object: wrong action, wrong object 
Force: too much, too short 
Direction: wrong direction 
Speed: too fact, too slow 
Distance: too far, too near. 
 
This method is proving to be a useful tool in the nuclear and aviation industry where the 
performance of tasks depends very much on human cognition. It has not, however, been 
widely accepted in the chemical process industry because the task conditions are different 
and vary from manual to semi-automated.  
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4.3.4 Incorporating Human Reliability Analysis into Quantitative Risk Analysis (State-of-
the-art) 
 
The main intention of QRA of a complex system is to determine the probability that the 
undesired event will occur when certain components fail, be they either technical or 
human and to what extent their consequences will be. HRA discussed above is used to 
generate the human error probabilities. The approach most applied in incorporating HRA 
into QRA is by application of fault tree analysis (FTA). FTA is a deductive system analysis 
where it is postulated that the system itself has failed in a certain way, and an attempt is 
made to find out what modes of system or subsystem (component) behaviour contributed 
to this failure (Joschek, 1981; Steinbach, 1999). 
 
The fault tree itself is a graphic model of the various parallel and sequential combinations 
of faults that will result in the occurrence of the predefined undesired event usually known 
as the top event. The faults can be events that are associated with component technical 
failures, human errors, and/or external events e.g. an earthquake or floods which can lead 
to the undesired event. A fault tree thus depicts the logical interrelationships of basic 
events that lead to the undesired event, the top event of the fault tree. 
 
FTA uses the concept that an outcome is a result of binary combination. Binary AND and 
OR gates are used to combine the events that lead to top event. In the first instance, FT is 
a qualitative model but is often quantified to calculate the probability of the top event.  
 
HRA could either be qualitative or quantitative. For the purpose of illustrating the state-of-
the-art of HRA in QRA an example is going to be used. This is a case study originally 
done by (Ozog, 1985) but has been modified to fit  this specific situation. The system 
under investigation is a storage tank which holds a flammable liquid under low positive 
nitrogen. It is as shown in Fig 4-2. The pressure is controlled by a pressure control PICA-
1. In case of overpressurisation, a relief valve RV-1 opens. The liquid is delivered in to the 
storage tank from tank trucks and is supplied to the process via pump PI-1.  
 
A hazard and operability (HAZOP) study was done and the most serious hazard identified 
was unrecoverable release from the storage tank. More details on HAZOP can be obtained 
from (Kletz, 1999). For this event a fault tree was constructed. Only the portion of the 
fault tree relevant to this study is illustrated in fig 4-3. 
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Figure 4-5: P& ID of flammables liquid storage tank (Ozog, 1985) 
 
Each basic event is assigned a probability value. The final probability or frequency of the 
top event is obtained by combining the probabilities of the basic events. The basic events 
B1, B2, B3, ….,Bn represents technical failures, human error events and external event 
causes. The calculations start at the bottom of the tree and proceed upwards to the top 
event.  From this example, the frequency of a major release (3.2 x 10-2 per year) is 
dominated by human errors. Initiating events could be a single or a combination of basic 
events. For instance, from the fault tree analysis it was found that the following basic 
events contained human failure elements in them: Basic event B1: Insufficient Volume in 
Tank; B2: Level Alarm fails or ignored; B3: Wrong Material Fed into Tank; B4: Truck Tank 
not sampled before unloading and B5: Unloading Frequency. The value of top event is the 
summation of all minimum cut-sets. Basic events B1, B2 and B5 make one minimum cut-set 
which has a frequency value of 3 x 10-2 yr-1. Using Fussell-Vesely (F-V) level of importance 
this cut-set contribute to 94% of the top event occurrence. It is usually the case that 
human error dominates a risk assessment, if it is properly considered in the analysis.  
 
Incorporating HRA into QRA has some limitations some of which have been mentioned 
in section 4.3.1. Most are inherent in the HRA methodologies themselves and in the 
human error probability data. There exists a large failure rate databank for technical 
components. 
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Figure 4-6: Fault tree Analysis of a Major Spill  
 
4.3.5 New Approach 
 
It is also relatively easy to estimate the probability for external events’ occurrence.  On the 
contrary, HRA data is rare, outdated and many times purely subjective. However, it is 
critical that the potential human causes for major accidents be exhaustively identified and 
quantified for a complete QRA.  
 
Unfortunately, the tools currently used by analysts for hazards identification do not 
adequately address the problem (AIChE, 1994). HAZOP could have been described as a 
compromise tool for hazard identification. Yet, it is skewed towards hardware failures. It 
can be argued that with knowledge and experience one could use it to identify human 
errors as well. But it is obviously preferable to have a tool to help in error identification 
even if the analyst does not have much experience and knowledge. Such a systematic 
method is lacking and this is what this work is striving to achieve.  
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Moreover, when carrying out a human reliability analysis (HRA), each human error event 
is assigned a probability of occurrence. The probability value is generic and therefore does 
not represent the actual conditions of the system or plant being analysed. Each plant 
conditions differ significantly from others. Analysing and quantifying human factors is to 
help evaluate the quality of factors affecting operator performance in a particular system or 
plant. One should be able to establish and measure the EPC/factors that surround each 
operator error. The intention is that this work shall reflect situation specific factors as far 
as reasonably practicable, with respect to technical systems as well as human and 
organisational factors. 
 
The new approach recommends the following:  
i) After a fault tree has been constructed, the basic events are qualitatively 
analysed to find those with human error elements in them.  
ii) These are further analysed to find out the specific underlying human factors 
that could act as error producing conditions. 
iii) These human factors are quantified for use in QRA 
 
This procedure is described graphically in fig 4- 4. This approach is divided in two major 
categories. First is the qualitative evaluation of human factors and then the quantification 
part.  
 
Figure 4-7: Procedure to identify human factors underlying an unwanted event 
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In broad perspective, the procedure is divided into two parts. The first part is qualitative 
and will be described in further details in chapter 6. The second is quantitative and will be 
covered in chapter 7.  
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5 MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
It is clear that most of the factors that affect human performance can only be assessed and 
solved subjectively. This is because scientific methods have not been adapted well to solve 
human-related problems, which is partly as a result of lack of data. Objectivity is relative to 
the knowledge available and if hard data does not exist then cognitive processes have to be 
used (Saaty and Kearns, 1985). Addressing such a problem requires an approach that 
enables the use of a variety of relevant information including both “hard” data such as 
quantifiable information and “soft” data commonly referred to as expert judgement which 
normally calls for cognitive processes. This approach should facilitate the use of creativity 
and experiences to structure the complex problem and pursue solutions in a systematic 
framework. 
 
5.2 Multi-Attribute Decision Analysis (MADA) 
 
The whole human factors spectrums form a complex social-technical problem. It is 
characterised by a mixture of qualitative units that need to be broken down into more 
manageable pieces to allow data and judgments to be brought to bear on the pieces, and 
then reassembling the pieces to present a coherent overall picture to the analyst. The 
methods of multi-attribute decision analysis (MADA) have been chosen because they are 
able to transform qualitative input (mostly in natural language) into quantitative output. 
The qualitative evaluation of human factors will be the input of the analysis. MADA 
methods apply to problems where the analyst is choosing or ranking a finite number of 
alternatives which are measured by two or more relevant attributes. (Chen and Hwang, 
1992) describe the principle MADA methods.  
 
Two methods are leading in these types of analysis viz Fuzzy sets (Zadeh, 1965) and 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). Fuzzy sets are broadly equivalent to the sets found in 
conventional mathematics and probability theory with one important exception. This 
exception is that, instead of membership of a set being crisp (that is, an element is either 
definitely a member of a given set or it is not), set membership is graduated, or fuzzy or 
imprecise. Set membership is defined by a membership function, µ(x), taking values 
between zero and one. Thus a particular issue might be regarded as a member of the set of 
major social concerns with a membership value of 0.8. A membership function value of 0 
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conveys definitely not a member of the set, while µ = 1 conveys definitely a member of 
the set. µ = 0.8 suggests quite a strong degree of belief that the problem is a major one, 
but not with complete certainty. The reason why fuzzy sets are not considered further is 
because of the following limitations:  
 
• a lack of convincing arguments that the imprecision captured through fuzzy sets 
and the mathematical operations that can be carried out on them actually match 
the real fuzziness of perceptions that humans typically exhibit in relation to the 
components of decision problems (Chen and Hwang, 1992). 
• doubts as to whether prescriptively trying to model imprecision, which is in some 
sense a descriptive reflection of the failings of unaided human decision processing, 
is the right way to provide support to deliver better decisions. 
• these methods tend to be difficult for non-specialists to understand, do not have 
clear theoretical foundations from the perspective of modelling decision makers' 
preferences and have not yet established that they have any critical advantages that 
are not available in other, more conventional models. 
 
In combination, issues such as these continue to throw substantial doubt on the practical 
value of fuzzy sets as a practical tool for supporting MADA. They remain for the moment 
largely confined to the academic literature or to experimental applications, although ideas 
about MADA based on fuzzy sets have been discussed for more than twenty years (Chen 
and Hwang, 1992).  
 
AHP was selected for this work because of the following strengths: it is well-known and 
well-reviewed in the literature; it includes an efficient attribute weighting process of pair-
wise comparisons; it incorporates hierarchical descriptions of attributes, which keeps the 
number of pair-wise comparisons manageable; and most of all, its use is facilitated by 
available software.  
 
5.3 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
MADA tools are the foundation of this method. These techniques are well-known 
decision support tools for dealing with complex decision constellations where 
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technological, economical and social aspects have to be covered (Cox et al., 2000). The 
method was developed by Saaty (Saaty, 1980). It is a means of prioritising impacts through 
a systematic representation of a problem. It uses hierarchical structure to decompose a 
problem into attributes and then guide decision makers through a series of pair-wise 
comparison judgement to express relative strength on impact of the attributes in the 
hierarchy. These judgements are then translated into numbers. 
 
Analytic Hierarchy Process is a framework characterised by simplicity and at the same time 
is robust enough to model real world complexities. It is founded on three principles which 
are important in problem solving. These are the principle of identity and decomposition, 
the principle of  discrimination and comparative judgment and the principle of synthesis of 
priorities (Saaty and Kearns, 1985).  
 
5.3.2 The Principle of Identity and Decomposition 
 
The principle calls for structuring the hierarchy to capture the elements of a given 
problem. Structuring the problem hierarchically is guided by no specific rule and therefore 
allows the user to construct own model, see figure 5-1. This model is known as value tree.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Generic hierarchical decomposition 
 
However, an effective way is to proceed downwards with the focus on the top level to 
criteria bearing on the focus in the second level (factors) followed by sub-criteria 
(attributes) on the third level and so on. That is from the more general and somewhat 
uncertain to the more particular and definite. The top most level represents the goal or 
focus of the problem. The lower levels act as the elements contributing to the levels 
immediately above (Saaty and Kearns, 1985). The bottom most elements are known as 
attributes. In the context of this work the overall goal is to determine the quality of human 
factors index and by assessing those attributes that have direct impact. For the purpose of 
this work thirty attributes were derived and are outlined on table 6-1 that appears on page 
61. They include human factors and safety policy, organisational culture, training, display 
  
Factor 1   
Attribute 1   Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4   
Factor 2 Factor 3 
Goal 
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design just to mention a few. The law of hierarchic continuity requires that the elements of 
the bottom level of the hierarchy be comparable in pair-wise way according to the 
elements in the next level and so on to the focus of the hierarchy.  
 
5.3.3 The Principle of Discrimination and Comparative Judgement 
 
Once the problem is decomposed into a hierarchy, each element must be compared to 
other elements at that same level using matrices of pair-wise comparison.  All identified 
attributes in the same level are compared against each other in a matrix pair-wise 
comparison to express the relative preference among the factors/attributes on properties 
that they share in common. The elements in the second level are compared with each 
other in respect to the overall objective /focus; the third level elements are compared with 
respect to the appropriate parents in the second and so on down the hierarchy.  The 
questions asked at the bottom level could take the form “When comparing different 
attributes, which attribute is more important (in achieving the goal)?”  
 
 Let η  be a finite set of elements. Let ϕ  be a set of attributes (features attached to an 
object) with respect to which elements in η are compared. When two elements inη are to a 
criterion in ϕ  then we are performing a binary or a pair-wise comparison. Let f be binary 
relation on η  representing “more preferred than” with respect to a criterion inϕ . Let  ≈  
represent “indifferent to” with respect to a criterion C inϕ . 
 
Hence for any two elements Ai, Aj∈η , either AifAj or AjfAi or Ai ≈Aj for all C∈ϕ . Let 
φ  be a set of mappings from η x η  to ℜ + (set of positive reals). Let f:ϕ → φ , and 
Pc∈ f(C) for all C∈ϕ . Pc acquires a real positive number to every pair Ai, Aj ∈  η xη . 
 
Example:  
A company intends to locate a site in four countries. It compares four countries: A1 = 
Germany, A2 = Kenya, A3 = Britain and A4= China using a criterion “Quality and 
Reliability of Utilities”. In this case our elements Ai = A1, …, A4. Mapping these elements 
into η xη  we have the matrix shown on the next page.  
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Quality and  
Reliability of Utilities
A1 A2 A3 A4
A1     
A2     
A3     
A4     
 
Comparing the elements an analyst came up with the following preferences: A1fA2, 
A1≈A3, A1fA4 and A3fA2. Implying that A1 is morepreferred than A2 and A1 has the 
same preference as A3 given the mentioned criterion. 
 
Let Pc (Ai, Aj) ≡ aij ∈  ℜ +, and Ai, Aj∈η . For each criterion C∈ϕ ; η xη , ℜ + and Pc are 
mappings of elements to a numerical system. 
 
For all Ai, Aj ∈η  and C∈ϕ  
AifAj  if and if only Pc(Ai, Aj) > 1, 
Ai ≈Aj  if and if only Pc(Ai, Aj) = 1 
 
AifAj implies that Ai dominates Aj with respect to C∈ϕ . Therefore Pc represents the 
intensity of preference for one alternative over the other.  
And for all Ai, Aj ∈η  and C∈ϕ  
 
Pc(Ai, Aj) = 1/ Pc(Aj, Ai) 
 
This could be written as aij  = 1/ aji =wi / wj and therefore matrix A. 
 
 
Let M1, M2, ....Mn be any set of n elements and w1, w2, ...,wn the corresponding weights or 
intensities. If we compare each element’s intensity with the intensity of every other 
element in the set with respect to a property that they have in common, then this could be 
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represented as in the matrix shown here below. This type of matrix is known as matrix of 
pairwise comparison. 
  
 
Where wi > 1, i = 1, 2, 3, …, n. 
 
When the intensities wi are not known then the elements are compared using subjective 
judgment using a scale of numbers. In such cases there are deviations between the exact 
measurements and the human judgments and sometimes these deviations are large.  
 
From the matrix, wi/wj = aij 
 
For each fixed i, wi = 1/n (ai1w1, ai2w2,……., ainwn) 
    
   = n/1 wa j
n
j
ij∑=1   (i, j= 1, 2, ….,n) (5.1) 
   
This is applicable for consistent matrices, but for cases where there is deviation of aij we 
denote n by maxλ , which is commonly known as the maximum eigenvalue. If A is a matrix 
of pairwise comparison values aij, in order to find a priority vector, we must find a vector 
w which satisfies  
 
Aw = maxλ w       (5.2) 
 
To solve the particular problem in this work subjective judgment is going to be used 
because there are no “hard” data available for quantifying different weights of human 
factors. This approach tries to translate the natural language of factors that are intangible 
into quantities. An example is; procedures are “slightly more important” than training 
when it comes to preventing human error. 
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In the matrix, one begins with an element on the left and asks how much more important 
it is than an element listed on the top. When compared to itself then the ratio is 1. The 
reciprocal is entered in the transpose position of the matrix and therefore we only deal 
with n(n-1)/2 judgments where n is the rank of the matrix.  
 
A scale to make subjective pair-wise comparisons is recommended (Saaty, 1980; Saaty and 
Kearns, 1985) and is illustrated in table 5-1. The basis of this scale and justification of why 
it is indeed more preferable than all others can be found in (Saaty, 1980). Judgment is 
elicited from people who have knowledge about the relative importance of elements with 
respect to the overall problem. In this study a questionnaire was formulated and 
respondents were people from the process industry who are directly or indirectly involved 
with EH & S departments. The results of the questionnaire will be discussed in chapter 6. 
In making the comparisons of X with Y questions like “which is more important or has 
more impact” are asked.  If the elements on the left are more important than the element 
on the top then a positive integer (1 < w <9) is entered. If it is less then the reciprocal of 
the integer will be entered. The relative importance of any element to itself is one and 
therefore the diagonal of the matrix (upper left to lower right) contains 1.  
 
Table 5-1: Scale for comparisons (Saaty and Kearns, 1985) 
 
Intensity of 
Relative 
Importance 
 
 
Definition 
 
 
Explanation 
1 Equal importance. Two activities contribute equally to the objective. 
 
3 Moderate importance of one over another. Experience and judgment slightly favour one 
activity over another. 
 
5 Essential or strong importance. Experience or judgment strongly favours one 
activity over another. 
 
7 Demonstrated importance. An activity is strongly favoured and its dominance 
is demonstrated in practice. 
 
9 Extreme importance. The evidence favouring one activity over another is 
of the highest possible order of affirmation. 
 
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values between the two adjacent 
judgments. 
When compromise is needed. 
  
Since small changes aij brings about small changes in maxλ . This is the deviation of the 
maximum eigenvalue from n and this is defined as the consistency measure and is known 
as consistency index, CI. It enables the evaluation of closeness of derived scale from and 
underlying scale which we wish to estimate. Therefore,  
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1
max
−
−=
n
n
CI
λ
     (5.3) 
 
A randomly generated reciprocal matrix from the scale 1 – 9 is known as random 
consistency index (RI). It is obtained from large number of simulation runs and is 
dependent on the order of the matrix n. Saaty generated an average RI for matrices of 
order 1 to 10 using a sample size of 500 (Saaty, 2000) and this is shown on Table 5-2.  
 
Table 5-2: Values for Random consistency Index 
 
The consistency ratio CR was defined as the ratio of the consistency index CI to an 
average RI for the same order matrix, therefore 
 
CR = CI/RI      (5.4) 
 
A consistency ratio (CR) of 0.1 or less is considered acceptable. 
Size of Matrix, n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Random Consistency Index, RI 0 0 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.49 
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6 DEVELOPMENT OF QUALITATIVE HUMAN FACTORS TOOL 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The human performance can best be presented using human behaviour models. Models 
that deal with cognition are discussed in a number of behavioural sources (Norman, 1988; 
Wickens and Hollands, 2000). Most of the HRA use stimulus-response models and in this 
case much of cognition is not considered. On the contrary, human beings should be 
considered as information processing systems which include perception and perceptual 
elements, memory, sensory storage, working memory, long term memory and decision 
making (Sanders and McCormick, 1993).  
 
The model adapted for this work combines the elements of stimulus-response and the 
information processing domains. This will help consider the aspects of detection, 
recognition, discrimination and interpretation.   
 
A human machine system comprises of a human operator, a control and a display/alarm, 
see fig 6-1. Reliability of the control and that of the display/alarm is easy to obtain using 
the existing reliability methods. 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Basic components of human system interface 
 
This set-up is common in offloading operations. The operator observes the level gauge 
and closes the valve when the tank is full. The illustrative example demonstrates an 
operation that is entirely manual. For such an operation and any other operator task the 
main steps that take place are illustrated in fig 6-2. It is observable that in this model 
detailed information processing has been included.  
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Figure 6-2: Steps in a human operator control operation: adapted from (Kariuki and Löwe, 2006; 
Wickens and Hollands, 2000) 
 
There are three main perceptual categories viz. detection, recognition and discrimination. 
These are defined as follows (Snyder, 1973):  
 
Detection: This is when an observer correctly indicates his decision that an object of interest 
exists in the field of view. 
Recognition: When the observer correctly indicates to which class of objects the detected 
object belongs. 
 Discrimination: When the observer correctly separates the single target of interest from the 
group of recognised targets 
 
The quality of these three categories brings a clear situation awareness and therefore makes 
the operator be able to interpret and act correctly in a given situation. An operator error 
can occur at any of these steps. During perception phase the operator can, for example, 
misread information, misperceive or fail to detect visual or auditory information. He may 
fail to make the right decision due to memory capacity overload, similarity of information 
perceived or due to lack of or incorrect knowledge. Wrong action could be contributed by 
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similarities in (hard to discriminate) controls or interruption from the environment among 
others (Kariuki and Löwe, 2006).  
 
As illustrated in fig 6-3, to a big percentage the output operator errors are determined by 
the quality of several system/plant attributes x1, x2,…….xn, on the left hand side of the 
diagram. The attributes are characterised by the performance measures r1, r2,…,rn. These 
attributes are human factors. Since each human factor attribute influences the error 
causation differently then weights ω1, ω2, ….. ωn are assigned (Kariuki and Löwe, 2005; 
Kariuki and Löwe, 2006). The procedure to assign r and ω is discussed in later sections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Factors influencing frontline operator error 
 
Not all errors are caused by inadequate human factors. Others could be deliberate acts of 
sabotage and single extraneous acts and are classified under “other influences and error 
types”. These are not discussed further in this work.  
 
In order to increase operator reliability the performance measures, ri for attributes that 
have influence on perception, decision or action of the operator should be maximised. 
That means maximising r1, r2,…,rn in order to reduce error opportunities. 
Attribute,x1
Attribute,x2
Attribute,xn
ω1
ω2
ωnPe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 m
ea
su
re
, v
al
ue
 fu
nc
tio
n 
vi
(x
i)
∑
=
n
i
iii xv
1
)(ω
Perception Decision Action
Other influences & 
error types
Output Operator 
error
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 m
ea
su
re
, v
al
ue
 fu
nc
tio
n 
vi
(x
i)
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 m
ea
su
re
, v
al
ue
 fu
nc
tio
n 
vi
(x
i)
Integrating Human Factors into Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis                                           58 
It was mentioned in section 5.3.2 that this work has a total of thirty HF attributes. In the 
next section all the steps that were undertaken to develop and classify these attributes will 
be discussed. The development of HF guideline builds the foundation of this task. The 
current state of HF in the process industry and development of the actual HF guideline are 
described. This consequently leads to the classification of HF attributes.  
 
6.2 Development of Process Industry Management (PRISM) Guideline 
 
6.2.1 Background 
 
The European Union chemical process industry realised the importance of human factors in 
relation to safety. For this reason European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) formed a network 
called Process Industry Safety Management (PRISM). It was comprised of leading operating 
companies, consultancies and research institutes in Europe. PRISM was founded with the aim 
of finding ways to improve safety in the European process industries through raising awareness 
of, and sharing experience in, the application of human factors approaches. In addition the 
network aimed to stimulate the development and improvement of human factor approaches in 
order to address industry-relevant problems in batch and continuous process industries 
(PRISM, 2004). This network focused on small and medium enterprises (SME’s) and big firms 
that do not have mature safety management systems. The overall aims of the project were 
improvement of safety in process industries through: 
 
 Sharing best practice on Human Factors. 
 Bringing together the best from Industry /Authorities/Universities /Consultants. 
 Identifying unmet industry needs. 
 
The network had four focus groups, structured in such a way that all the human factor 
areas were sufficiently covered. The groups were as follows:  
 
9 FG1: Cultural and organisational factors 
9 FG2: Optimising human performance 
9 FG3: Human factors in high demand situations 
9 FG4: Human factors as part of the engineering design process 
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The final deliverable for each focus group was a HF guideline on the respective areas. Focus 
Group 4 of the network was composed of a team from TU Berlin (including the author), 
ExxonMobil and a representative from Snamprogetti. Before the guidelines were developed 
TU-Berlin investigated human factors state-of-the-art in the European Union chemical process 
industry. 
 
6.2.2 State-of-the-art in the process industry 
6.2.2.1 Internet-based survey 
 
A large-scale internet-based survey across Europe was carried out. More than 70 representatives 
of small, medium and large enterprises were requested by email, telephone and/or in person to 
fill out a questionnaire.  
 
An internet based questionnaire was created because it possessed the following advantages: 
 
• its assured that the questionnaire is anonymous 
• no macros are required as in case of excel case 
• good and simple distribution to “users” is established 
• the questionnaire follows a systematic approach 
• the “user” is guided through the questionnaire 
• generally, the aim is to avoid that any questions are left unanswered 
• the questionnaire provides multiple choice wherever appropriate 
• statistical evaluation of large data amounts can be fully automated  
 
The questionnaire was installed on the internet and tested for compatibility with different 
hardware and software systems (Löwe et al., 2005). 
 
6.2.2.2 Results 
 
Some of the numerous analyses and interpretations of the survey that were made are 
presented as follows: 
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What are the percentages of the operating states when events occur? 
 
The results are illustrated on the figure 6-5 (Löwe et al., 2005). There is a clear indication 
that most events take place when the human operator interacts with the system. 
Loading/unloading, maintenance/repair and start-up/shutdown operations constitute 
52% of these events and coincidentally that is where the biggest interaction between the 
operator and the system is found. For comparison the results of a study performed by 
Uth, who examined events in Germany in the period from 1993-96 are presented. 
Conspicuous is, that in 50% of the events occurs in normal operation procedures. 
Loading/unloading procedures were not considered separately. Loading/unloading 
operations are part of the normal operation of the plant. Adding the events during loading-
unloading procedures to the events during normal process operation yields a result that 
agrees very well with the percentage of the Uth study (Uth, 1999). 
 
 
Figure 6-4: Operating state when events occur 
 
 “The causes of the events are:” 
 
Only 23% of the events are attributed to technical failures. The respondents felt that 64 % 
of events are due to human failures.  
 
Figure 6-5: Major causes of events in the process industries 
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The causes given under “others” were examined for a comparison with the study carried 
out by (McCafferty, 1995). McCafferty examined the events in the USA in oil and gas 
companies. In his study 80% are caused by human failures. Some causes of events named 
under “others” are: Work places, management system (which was mentioned more than 
once), systems failure, design, lack of knowledge of chemistry. Some of the causes like 
‘inadequate work places’ and ‘inadequate management system’ are considered to be in the 
area of human failure. Adding these to human failure causes corresponds to the statistics 
obtained by McCafferty. 
 
The causes of the human failures are? 
 
Of all the human failures 59% are attributed to organisational failure and 25% are due to 
inadequate facilities. These may be termed as inadequate technical design of the plant 
 
                      
Figure 6-6: Causes of human failures 
 
In summary, the study came out with the following conclusions, which are relevant to this 
work: 
◊ A large number of companies do not have experts on HF / ergonomics. 
◊ Causes of unwanted events are predominantly human failures. 
◊ There exists none or rather no systematic methods for considering HF in the 
design process 
 
It could be said that human factors have not yet been given the importance they deserve in 
order to reduce human failure in the industry. These results could be attributed to the 
following (Baybutt, 1996): 
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 Lack of awareness: engineers pay much attention to machine reliability and fail to 
factor-in the end user. 
 Lack of need: many engineers are still unaware of the benefits that considering 
human factors might bring. 
 Misunderstanding of human factors: some engineers might think that it is some 
psychological study by which they are going to be judged rather than improve the 
safety in the plant. 
 Fear of the effort of involving human factors into the plant design: engineers 
normally have already a big workload and might fear that including farther human 
factor studies might overload their capacities. 
 Fear of the companies that by starting to consider the human factors, the resulting 
guidelines and recommendations will end being obligatory and of expensive 
implementation. 
 Lack of integration: even if some approaches are already available, they have not 
been implemented yet into the industries, partially because redesigning an already 
working plant is difficult and expensive and on the other side because the effort of 
having human error analysts, behavioural scientists and human factor specialists 
working together has not been done yet. 
 Lack of approaches to solve some human factor issues, especially when they 
involve organisational or socio-technical problems. 
 Lack of qualified analysts: due to the novelty of this science there are not enough 
experts with an adequate knowledge on the fields of chemical engineering, risk 
assessment methods, human error analysis and human factors engineering. 
  Lack of motivation: until 1990 there were no regulations or directives that forced 
consideration of the human factors. 
 
6.2.3 The PRISM Guideline 
 
The aim of the guideline is to assist engineers to design a process facility that addresses the 
capabilities and limitations of the operator. It shall be applicable to small and medium 
enterprises as well as large process industry set-ups. The guideline was written to act as a 
one-step source of information of human factors requirements in all engineering design. 
Both engineers with human factors background as well as those with no practical 
experience in this field could use it. The guideline covers the five main areas that are 
represented in figure 6-8.  
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Figure 6-7: Subject areas for consideration of Human Factors during design (Kariuki and Löwe, 
2005; Löwe et al., 2005) 
 
For effective practical application the guideline is provided with helpful tools, diagrams 
and graphics. The guideline is published on the PRISM- Homepage (PRISM, 2004). It is 
easy to read and use because it has a lot of cross-references to other human factors 
resources that are relevant. 
6.2.3.1 Practical experience  
 
To ensure practical applicability a validation of the guideline was carried out (Löwe et al., 
2005). This validation was done at Chinoin Co. Ltd, member of Sanofi-Aventis Group. 
This plant is located in Budapest, Hungary. 
 
The validation was aimed at answering the following questions: 
 Is the guideline applicable in the practical world? 
 Does it cover the most important human factors issues? 
 Is it understandable by both human factor experts and non-experts? 
 Does it serve as an eye opener to the wider human factors field? 
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There was an agreement that it was a good idea to come up with the guideline. This is 
because the process industry still lacked a single source of human factor guidance. The 
little that is available is incomplete and is scattered in the general safety regulations and 
standards. To bring them together will only mean additional pressures to cost and time 
resources allocated to the design activity. 
 
Chinoin Co. Ltd as many other companies is outsourcing most of its engineering work. 
This is of course economical but comes with major challenges. The contractors sometimes 
have a standard design that is not completely tailored to fit the operating needs of the 
customer.  
 
One of the major projects currently being undertaken is the reduction and reconfiguration 
of alarms. The design of this distributed control system (DCS) is based on international 
standardisation. On a particular day, for instance, 18% of the alarms appeared as critical, 
80% as warning and 2% as advisory. It had already been found out that most of the alarms 
that appear as warning and critical are actually nuisance alarms. An example is the level 
alarm for nitrogen that does not require any operator intervention or a warning in 
appearing due to delayed signal response. In the guideline it is suggested that on the higher 
side the critical alarms should be 15% while warning and advisory should be 45% and 55% 
respectively.  
 
In the same guideline the following is a suggested criterion for prioritising alarms: 
 
Priority 1: The abnormal situation may result in major consequences. The operator must 
act immediately. (Emergency action or Critical) 
 
Priority 2: An abnormal situation may bring major process upset but the operator still has 
some time to act. (Warning or caution) 
 
Priority 3: The existence of abnormal situation has no immediate effect on the process and 
calls for the operator to monitor the situation. (Monitoring, informative or advisory).  
 
Should the human factor design guideline have been available during the design it could 
have assisted in pinpointing the most important areas in alarms design and management 
and therefore too much effort would not be effected to carry out this modification.   
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PRISM Guideline was seen to be a good basis and a source of information for engineers 
on the issues to do with human factors during design. To make more complete it was felt 
that more cross-references are needed in areas where specific guidelines are available. 
 
6.3 Classification of Human Factors 
 
Human and organisational factors that are known to have influence on the performance of 
the operator are put in various groups. One of the most challenging tasks was to reach a 
consensus on the most practical classification of the whole human factors domain. The 
whole spectrum is large and has been approached in different ways by different authors 
(Attwood et al., 2004; Löwe et al., 2005). Moreover, factors that may apply in other 
industries e.g. nuclear, medical and/ or aviation may not be applicable in the chemical 
process industry. The classification of human factors was achieved through a wide 
consultation with the petro-chemical and chemical process industry. This was initially done 
during the development of PRISM guidelines mentioned in the earlier section and is 
illustrated in table 6-1. 
 
This classification has been validated twice. The first validation took place at Chinoin Co. 
Ltd as a part of PRISM guidelines validation as mentioned earlier.  
 
The second phase took place as part of a validation of a software to assess quality of 
human factors in the process industry. This was done at Bayer CropScience in their 
Frankfurt site. In this exercise it was agreed that the classification covered most of the 
factors that could affect human operator performance. But it was found that some 
attributes like “HF policy” need to be elaborated. In summary the factors outlined in table 
6-1 are thought to have the biggest influence on the operator performance. If any of them 
is inadequate then there is a higher probability of human error event.  
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Table 6-1: human and organisational factors in a process plant (Kariuki and Löwe, 2006) 
Factors Attributes 
Organisation (ORG): A1 Human factors and safety policy 
 A2 Organisational culture 
 A3 Management of change 
 A4 Organisational learning (audit & reviews) 
 A5 Line management & supervision 
Information (INF): B1 Training 
 B2 Procedures & procedure development 
 B3 Communication 
 B4 Labels & signs 
 B5 Documentation 
Job Design (JD): C1 Staffing, work schedules 
 C2 Shifts & overtime 
 C3 Manual handling 
Human System Interface (HSI) D1 Design of controls 
 D2 Displays 
 D3 Field control panels 
 D4 Tools (hand) 
 D5 Equipment & valves 
Task Environment (TE):  E1 Lighting /Illumination 
 E2 Temperatures 
 E3 Noise 
 E4 Vibration 
 E5 Toxicity 
Workplace Design (WD): F1 Facility layout 
 F2 Workstation configuration 
 F3 Control room 
 F4 Accessibility 
Operator Characteristics (OP): G1 Attention/ motivation 
 G2 Fitness for duty 
 G3 Skills and knowledge 
 
In the section below, these factors are elaborated further. The qualitative evaluation is 
done on a five level scale; from poor as the lowest to excellent as the highest. The factors 
are introduced here but the levels of maturity are listed on appendix A (Vadillo, 2006). 
 
6.3.1 Organisation 
 
6.3.1.1 Human factors policy 
 
An adequate policy is the driving force for improving and implementing an organisation’s 
human factors management system so that the organisation can maintain and potentially 
improve its human factor performance. By defining a human factor policy the organisation 
is recognising the need to consider the role of the human in operating or maintaining 
equipment or facilities or the impact of the equipment on the operators and maintainers. 
This policy should therefore reflect the commitment of top management, which consists 
of a person or group of people who direct and control an organisation at the highest level, 
to comply with applicable legal requirements and other requirements, to prevent accidents 
and to continually improve.  
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6.3.1.2 Organisational and Safety Culture 
 
This factor is a major component in determining an organisation’s safety performance and 
behaviour. Many researchers have worked on this field and therefore there are different 
ways of understanding and defining safety culture. Organisational culture is “a pattern of 
basic assumptions-invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope 
with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration- that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct 
way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems” (Schein, 1985). Baldrige 
National Quality Program (BNQP, 2005) divides safety culture in four different stages: 
a. Fire fighter: at this level problems are solved only when they have already 
appeared. The origins of the problems are not analysed. 
b. Compliance driven: at this level only the minimum legal requirements are achieved. 
c. Risk management: at this level a systematic method is developed for identifying 
and controlling hazards. Safety tasks and responsibilities are communicated. 
d. Continuous improvement: this level includes the risk management level and 
additionally safety incentives are used, improvement is encouraged through 
motivation and leadership. 
 
6.3.1.3 Management of change 
 
If the change is not well analysed, planned, implemented and controlled it can turn out to 
be reducing the defences against major hazards. “Companies should assess the workload 
and other implications of restructuring to ensure that key personnel have adequate 
resources, including time and cover, to discharge their responsibilities.” (HSE, 2003) 
Organisational changes include changes in role and responsibilities, organisational 
structure, staffing levels, staff disposition and others that might directly or indirectly affect 
the control hazards, such as changes in reporting relationships, objectives, resources, 
management system, available expertise for design, engineering support, procurement, etc.  
A change process should include getting organised for the change, assessing its risks and 
implementing and monitoring the change. 
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6.3.1.4 Organisational learning (audit and reviews) 
An audit evaluates whether the state of HF conforms to planned arrangements including 
the legal requirements and whether it has been properly implemented and is maintained. 
Internal audits of human factors aspects can be performed by personnel from within the 
organisation or by external persons selected by the organisation, working on its behalf. In 
either case, the persons conducting the audit should be competent and in a position to do 
so impartially and objectively. In smaller organisations, auditor independence can be 
demonstrated by an auditor being free from responsibility of the activity being audited 
(McLeod, 2004). 
 
6.3.1.5 Line management and supervision 
Supervision is a critical management function with great influence on health and safety 
issues, even if it is not always recognised as the direct cause of an accident in incident 
reports. It is important to determine which supervisory factors or characteristics are 
especially significant to health and safety issues.  
 
6.3.2 Information 
The main challenge is to ensure that operators have all the information they need to carry 
out their tasks safely and efficiently. Operators can receive information about the plant 
through direct perception, communication with the others and through displays and 
alarms. Operators must also know how to act according to the state of the plant.  
 
6.3.2.1 Training 
Training is a factor that provides the worker with the knowledge and skills required to be 
able to cope with tasks especially those that are novel or unique. New workers or changes 
in the control panel design, equipment design, job aids, procedures, new team or 
organisational structure might require additional training. Training is a key to improving 
human performance but should not be used to compensate for inadequate procedure 
design, labelling of equipment and poor HIS design. Common problems with training 
could be associated with inadequate training design, for instance classroom lectures with 
no practical exercises; training not adequately managed and monitored e.g. operator miss 
out training and therefore does not master the skills. Evaluation to see how successful the 
training has been is not carried out.  
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6.3.2.2 Procedures and procedure development 
The aim of procedures is to reduce the amount of decision-making required and the need 
for human memory to retain every single step and references of the task being carried out. 
Common problems encountered include incomplete procedures on assumption that an 
operator could complete the task using common sense or procedure steps are presented in 
the wrong sequence. Others could be wrong procedure used on equipment. This could be 
caused by wrong labelling, wrong procedures included in a work package or changes in an 
equipment are not indicated on the procedure. If the procedures are inadequate or 
problematic, they should be investigated in order to determine the level of maturity. 
 
6.3.2.3 Communication 
Lack of proper communication is detrimental to safety and has caused a number of 
accidents e.g. the Piper Alpha disaster. A good and effective communication allows the 
process to work properly and it has to be carefully implemented considering reporting 
lines, information exchange, employee involvement, two-way communication, etc. 
Communication has to be managed, which means that all channels of communication 
within an organisation and between organisations have to be systematically planned, 
implemented, monitored and revised.  
 
6.3.2.4 Labels and signs 
Labels and signs are important features for safety, because they remind the operator of the 
identity of equipment and key information. Labels identify plant equipment, components 
or areas. Signs contain messages that inform about hazards or remind about protective 
equipment requirements, instructions or some important procedures. Some of the 
problems found with labels are unclear and ambiguous language that include long 
messages, inadequate layout which make them invisible.  
 
6.3.2.5 Documentation 
Documentation includes user guides and manuals, user handbooks and technical 
instructions, job performance aids, quick reference guides, and instruction placards. It 
contributes to the user's cognitive understanding of the hardware, software, and human 
interactions with these other components of the system. Therefore, having the right 
documentation can improve performance in operation and allow a better communication 
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and training, a better maintenance and revision with a lower risk of ambiguity and 
deviations. 
 
6.3.3 Job Design 
Job design is the specification of the contents, method and relationships of jobs to satisfy 
technological and organisational requirements as well as the personal needs of job holders. 
While defining tasks, the workers abilities and limitations must be taken into account in 
order to achieve the best possible human performance. In order to achieve this goal it is 
important to ensure an adequate number of qualified staff, with well planned shifts and 
work schedules in order to reduce fatigue, stress and loss of concentration as much as 
possible. The job should also be designed in such a way that risks to worker health and 
safety are as low as possible especially for manual handling tasks. 
 
6.3.3.1 Staffing 
An adequately staffed organisation ensures that personnel are available with the proper 
qualifications for both planned and foreseeable unplanned activities. Staffing is a dynamic 
process in which plant management monitors personnel performance to ensure that 
overall organizational performance goals are met or exceeded. The result of an effective 
staffing process is a balance between personnel costs and the achievement of broader 
organisational goals. Some of the problems related to staffing would be:  
• Qualified staff being too few on a shift or a particular job that requires skilled 
workers. 
• Insufficient personnel leading to overloading and therefore stress. 
• Excessive personnel leading to poor co-ordination and communication. 
 
6.3.3.2 Work schedules, shifts and overtime 
Work schedules, shifts and overtime can have an impact on the way in which work is 
carried out. Human body has a biological rhythm within which the values of different 
physical measurements (such as body temperature, heart rate, and blood pressure) change. 
According to the stage of the rhythm in which the body is in, human alertness and 
performance can be altered. Statistics on accident and the time at which these accidents 
occur show that for each accident in the morning shift, there are 1.15 accidents in the 
evening shift (4pm until midnight) and 1.2 accidents in the night shift (midnight until 8am) 
(Attwood et al., 2004). This biological rhythm is important in designing of job and shifts. 
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While planning and designing work schedules, breaks and shifts, work rate and energy 
expenditure required for different tasks and efforts must be considered in order to plan 
the different duration and levels of work, rest periods, fatigue and posture effects. U.S. 
Defence Standard (DOD, 1997) provides guidance on this issue.  
 
6.3.3.3 Manual handling 
When manual handling is not safely performed, worker health can be damaged resulting in 
musculoskeletal disorders (Attwood et al., 2004). A qualitative screening approach assists 
in selecting the physical work tasks that need further consideration, because their risk 
needs to be reduced. Musculoskeletal disorders can be cumulative trauma disorders (CTD) 
due to repeated exposure to physical activity or an acute trauma caused by for instance a 
fall.  
 
6.3.4 Human System Interface 
This is the main point of interaction between the human and the system. Through this 
interface the operator knows what is going on in the system and can give some input, 
feedback or controlling measures to the system that in the end will alter its status. The 
limiting factor in this interface depends on the sensory, perceptual and physical operator’s 
capabilities (FAA, 2004). 
 
6.3.4.1 Design of controls 
There are different types of controls and they should be designed and chosen according to 
the accuracy and speed of operation required, to the available surface for its installation, to 
the operators’ expectations on how to operate them and to the consistency with other 
controls in the plant with the same function. The PRISM Guideline is a very valuable 
document for this aim.  
 
Inadequate design of controls could be, for example, designing too small controls that can 
accidentally be activated while switching on or off other controls. Another example is the 
consistency of the controls, at least in the same plant. If by activating some controls 
clockwise the flow increases and in some other cases it decreases, it will lead to errors 
especially during emergency situations. 
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6.3.4.2 Displays 
This includes both audio (alarms) and visual displays. Displays should provide the operator 
with a situation awareness of the process, so that the he/ she can then take the right 
actions and decisions at the right time. The amount and quality of the information has a 
direct influence on the identification, detection and reaction time needed by the operator. 
(PRISM, 2004) and (FAA, 2004) provide with very valuable information on displays. 
Inadequate design could be inaccessibility from normal working condition or too much 
unnecessary information.  
 
6.3.4.3 Field control panels 
These are the panels that contain displays and controls to monitor and control the 
operation of process equipment in a local area of the plant. It is very important that these 
fields are accurate and complete in labels, signs and instructions as well as easily and clearly 
visible with a good arrangement of the controls and the displays on the field and with all 
the lights and indicators working and connected to the right equipment . 
 
6.3.4.4 Tools 
Tools must be designed in such a way that they allow operators perform the task in the 
safest possible way. The size and morphology of the tool should fit the different users and 
foresee the possibility of being used by right- or left-hand sided people. The required tools 
should be available in the required amount at the workplace in order to prevent workers 
from performing the task without support of the adequate tool or substituting the tool by 
some other object not designed for this function.  
6.3.4.5 Equipment and valves 
Compressors, pumps, reactors, centrifuges, filters, furnaces, heaters, loading and unloading 
racks, columns, tanks and vessels fall under this category. Each of them should fulfil some 
guidelines to achieve the best practice (see PRISM Guidelines). Adequate accessibility to 
the equipment, to its different components and its local operation and emergency controls 
and displays, which will be showing the actual status of the important variables and 
parameters, will make the design of the plant and equipment approach the best practice. 
The location of the equipment, the safety showers, labels, procedures and warnings must 
also be taken into account. Ventilation, sample points, purges and maintenance and 
cleaning of the equipment must also be studied and integrated to the design.  
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When designing and installing valves, factors such as accessibility, priority and 
functionality arrangement and the force and position in which it has to be executed must 
be studied and considered.  
 
6.3.5 Environmental factors 
Environmental conditions that can affect performance include excessive vibration and 
noise, temperature extremes and insufficient lighting. These adverse environmental 
conditions can stress personnel, interfere with performance and increase the likelihood 
that they will commit errors while performing a task. Work conditions that require 
protective gear, such as confined space environments, or that require unusual physical 
postures, also can interfere with task performance, as may poor housekeeping. 
 
6.3.5.1 Lighting / Illumination 
Adequate lighting is required for accurate performance of nearly every task in a process 
plant. The amount of light falling on a surface depends on the light source, its distance 
from the surface, the angle of the surface to the light source and the number of light 
sources and reflecting sources in the immediate environment (Attwood et al., 2004).  This 
affects visibility. 
 
The ability to accurately perceive colours is affected by lighting.  Very low lighting levels 
also adversely affect colour discrimination. Glare and flicker will also reduce visual 
performance. Glare occurs when the luminance (the perceived brightness of an object) 
level is annoying. It may reduce contrast, interfere with reading and inspection tasks and 
cause visual fatigue. Flicker causes discomfort and eye fatigue when reading. 
 
6.3.5.2 Temperature, humidity and wind chill 
Humans can adapt to big variations in external temperature, but the body’s temperature is 
within a narrow range (36.1-37°C) and even small changes out of this range of internal 
temperature can produce serious damage to health and human performance. When 
workers begin to experience heat stress, they may become confused and disoriented, in 
addition to experiencing physical symptoms, and are very likely to commit errors if they 
attempt to continue working.  Exposure to cold affects the performance of manual tasks. 
Decrease in the ability to control hand movements begins at an air temperature of 
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approximately 12° C. The impact of environmental temperature on the human is also 
dependant on humidity and ventilation at the workplace. 
 
6.3.5.3 Noise 
Noise an auditory stimulus that does not provide any additional information to the task 
that is actually being performed or completed. It ca disrupt communications, affect the 
ability to perform tasks and annoy personnel. Noise over 90 dBA affects the overall 
performance. Over 100 dBA it affects the monitoring performance over a long duration. 
Task with long short-memory component, complex tasks and tasks requiring high 
perceptual or information processing capacity or performed without pauses between 
responses are affected by noise. However noise does not reduce performance on simple 
routine tasks or motor performance.  
 
6.3.5.4 Vibration 
There are two types of vibration that may cause errors. The first is whole-body vibration, 
in which vibration is transferred to the worker from standing or sitting on a vibrating 
surface. The second is object vibration, in which a stationary worker interacts with a 
vibrating object in some fashion. It can affect motor control and visual performance. 
Motor control is mainly affected by the vibration intensity. Visual performance is mainly 
affected by the frequency.  
 
6.3.5.5 Toxicity and air quality 
The air quality in closed working places depends on parameters such as the external air 
quality, the air conditioning system design and its working conditions, the way the working 
place is partitioned and the amount and sort of pollutant sources. Some effects of bad air 
quality can be nausea, headaches, memory losses, concentration problems, evasive 
behaviour, hypersensitivity reactions among others. 
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6.3.6 Workplace Design 
 
6.3.6.1 Facility layout 
The layout of the plant should be such that it limits the risk to the lowest possible during 
operations, inspection, testing, maintenance, modification, repair and replacement. 
According to the COMAH Assessment Safety Report on Mechanical Engineering Aspects, 
evidence that these matters have been adequately considered in the design will usually be 
sufficient for the purposes of assessment. The plant design should provide enough 
safeguards to ensure safety and reliability even against excursions beyond design 
conditions. Safety report should show how systems which require human interaction have 
been designed to take into account the needs of the user and be reliable. Task and Link 
analysis can be very good tools in order to improve the facility layout. 
 
6.3.6.2 Workstation configuration 
The workstation is the area in which the person performs tasks and it is defined by the 
physical fixtures such as furniture, equipment, machinery, stairs or aisles among others and 
environmental variables such as lighting, vibration, temperature, toxicity or noise. 
Configuration of these places will refer to how the design is made to suit the 
characteristics of different individuals having to work in them.  
 
6.3.6.3 Accessibility 
A good workplace design allows people to physically reach all required equipment, tools 
and parts of the plant during operations, inspections, maintenance and/or repair. 
Workstation must be accessible to cranes as well as to workers with the clothing and tools 
required to work and they must ensure operators work in a comfortable way, without 
needing to crawl or stay in awkward positions while approaching the workstation or 
performing the task. This means that pathways to the workstation and the distance 
between adjacent equipment have to be large enough for this purpose.  
 
6.3.6.4 Control room design 
The room should be arranged in such a way that it best suits the operators’ functions. A 
link analysis will show the relations between the operators in the control room and the 
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equipment. Important aspects in the control room include lighting, noise, ventilation, 
communication and location 
 
6.3.7 Operator characteristics 
The operators’ physical and cognitive characteristics, their skills, knowledge, attention, 
motivation, fitness for duty and competence will also have an influence on human error.  
 
6.3.7.1 Skills and knowledge 
Skills refer to how humans process and interpret the information. They are not inherent 
personal qualities and can be acquired through training and experience. They refer to the 
ability to recall and carry out each step of the task that has been assigned to them, 
technical reading and drawing skills, physical, cognitive, visual and hearing abilities. 
Knowledge requirements describe what the person needs to know and understand in order 
to satisfactorily perform the task for example knowledge of hazards, equipment, plant 
processes and operation procedures, rules and limits. 
 
6.3.7.2 Attention/Motivation 
The amount of stimuli that can be perceived by sensory systems is unlimited, but the 
amount of information that can be held in the working memory is limited to between five 
and nine items.  
6.3.7.3 Fitness for duty 
Fitness for duty is the ability to perform activities within an occupation or function to the 
standards expected in employment (Wright et al., 2002). This refers to matching 
individuals to tasks to ensure an adequate outcome. Individuals should be able to 
successfully undertake the specific tasks and activities to which they are assigned.  
6.4 Qualitative Evaluation of Human Factors 
 
The fault tree in figure 4-3 is going to be revisited in this subsection and the next chapters. 
The first three steps in figure 4-4 will be the main point of focus. The purpose of human 
factors analysis is to assign specific failure probabilities for each initiating event based on 
different underlying human factors on a selected incident. The existing models of present 
QRA have been taken as the basis for this new methodology. When an initiating event 
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occurs a series of pivotal events 1 to N occurs before impact. Pivotal events could prevent, 
protect or mitigate the deviation or aggravate the situation.  
 
Step 1: Identifying the causes of undesired event. 
 
All the initiating events and basic events are identified using the conventional QRA 
methodologies. For this study an FTA is used, see figure 4-3. The top event “Major 
Flammable Release” which has a frequency of 3.2 x 10-2/yr could be caused either by : 
 
Spill during truck unloading    3.0 x 10-2/yr 
Tank rupture due to external event   3.0 x 10-5/yr 
Tank drain ruptures     1.0 x 10-4/yr 
Tank rupture due to implosion   2.0 x 10-3/yr 
Tank rupture due to overpressure   2.0 x 10-5/yr  
 
This classification is irrespective of the type of failure. If we look closely it is clear that 
events contributing most to the top event is spill during truck unloading (93.75%).  This is 
one of the reasons we will concentrate on analysis of the event “Spill during truck 
unloading”. The other reason is that this event has human error events in it. This value is 
the summation of all minimum cut-sets. Basic events B1 (Insufficient volume in tank), B2 
(Level alarm fails or ignored) and B5(Unloading frequency) make one minimum cut-set 
which has a frequency value of 3 x 10-2 yr-1. . Minimum cut-sets are defined as set of basic 
events that contains no redundant elements (AIChE, 2000).  
 
Step 2: Identifying initiating events with human error elements 
 
This approach is striving in coming up with a systematic methodology to analyse the 
situation that may lead to human error. The approach should be able to predict the 
conditions that support the occurrence of error. This means we are shifting our attention 
from the error itself and focusing on the factors that support the occurrence of the error. 
From the fault tree analysis of flammable liquid storage tank, it was found that the 
following basic events contained human failure elements in them: Basic event B1: 
Insufficient Volume in Tank; B2: Level Alarm fails or ignored; B3: Wrong Material Fed 
into Tank; B4: Truck Tank not sampled before unloading and B5: Unloading Frequency. 
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These are typical events found during FTA. Not all basic events are classified as initiating 
events.  Event B1 may not be classified as an initiating event but for the top event to occur 
this condition (filling the tank) has to be present. Any time the condition is present then an 
opportunity for error occurs. It is referred to as enabling event (AIChE, 2000). 
 
Step 3: Identifying underlying human factor causes 
 
Figure 6-9 represents the procedure to identify the underlying human factors. After the 
initiating events or hazardous conditions have been identified the human factors 
influencing these human error events are identified. One initiating event or basic event is 
analysed at a time. Each factor is considered to determine how much it could influence 
initiating event. The factors identified to have a “high” influence are given first priority, 
second priority goes to “moderate” and “low” gets the last priority. The reason for this 
classification is to limit the number of attributes to a manageable level. The maximum 
number of attributes recommended for the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is seven 
(Saaty, 2000). This method is going to be used for the quantification of human factors and 
is discussed in later chapters. 
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Figure 6-8: Procedure to identify the human factors underlying human error event (Kariuki and 
Löwe, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High     Moderate     Low 
Would communication influence occurrence of initiating 
event?  
Would labels & signs influence occurrence of initiating 
event?  
Would documentation influence occurrence of initiating 
event?  
Would work schedules, staffing, shifts &  overtime influence
occurrence of initiating event?  
Would manual handling & cumulative trauma disorders 
(CTD) influence occurrence of initiating event?  
Would procedures & procedure development 
occurrence of initiating event?  
Would workstation configuration influence occurrence of 
initiating event?  
Would supervision influence occurrence of initiating event? 
Would human-system-interface (controls, displays, field 
control panels, hand tools equipment & valves) influence 
occurrence of initiating event?  
Would task environment (lighting, noise, temperatures, 
toxicity) influence occurrence of initiating event?  
Would accessibility influence occurrence of initiating event?
Would operators physical characteristics influence 
occurrence of initiating event?  
Would attention/ motivation influence occurrence of 
initiating event?  
Would stress and fatigue, illness influence occurrence of
initiating event?  
Would operators skills & knowledge influence occurrence 
of initiating event?  
Would training influence occurrence of initiating event?  
Training
Communication
Procedures 
Labels & signs
Documentation
Work Schedules
Manual Handling 
Supervision 
Human-system-
interface 
Task environment
Workstation 
configuration  
Accessibility  
Operator 
charactersitcs  
Attention/ 
motivation  
Fitness for duty 
Knowledge & 
Skills  
Got to next 
Yes 
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Table 6-2 illustrates a summary of attributes that may have significant impact on basic 
events B1, B2 and B3. These have been identified using the procedure illustrated in figure 6-
8. It is worth to note that this exercise is subjective and therefore may require input from 
several experts to make it valid. 
 
Table 6-2: Attributes having significant impact on basic events B1, B2 and B3. 
 Information Supervision Human-
System 
Interface 
Design 
Task 
Environment
Workplace 
Design 
Operator 
Characteristics 
Basic Events       
B1: Insufficient 
Volume in tank 
Procedures 
Documentation 
Training 
Checks Displays    
B2: High level 
alarm fails or 
ignored 
Training  Displays Lighting Accessibility Attention / Motivation 
Skills and Knowledge 
B3: Wrong 
material in tank 
Documentation 
Labels & Signs 
Checks    Attention/Motivation 
Fitness for duty 
 
 
As an example, ordering procedures influence the volume that is available in the receiving 
tank. If documentation were not done adequately then ordering twice would be a feasible 
error. Job allocation determines the amount of workload on the operator. Supervision is 
another factor that needs to be analysed under this human error event. In this case task 
environment i.e. noise, heat, lighting, has no effect at all and so is the work place design. 
Each human error event identified as a cause of accident is analysed in the same way.   The 
parameters or attributes identified will be used to modify the generic human error 
probabilities. The HF attributes should be specific enough to identify potential influences. 
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7 QUANTIFICATION OF HUMAN FACTORS AND INTEGRATION 
INTO QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS 
 
7.1 Implementation of AHP in Overall Human Factors Assessment 
 
7.1.1 Hierarchical Decomposition 
 
The first step is to decompose human factors hierarchically. This is done as illustrated in 
fig 7-1. The aim of the decomposition is to find out the factors that influence the quality 
of human factors in a given plant. The overall objective is to maximise the quality index. 
This means that as the human factors index approaches maximum then the human 
performance is optimal and it will be reasonable to say that the rate of human error 
probability goes down. Through extensive literature review and consultation with experts 
from industry it has been found that the areas (referred here as factors) that have the 
biggest direct effect on this index are organisation, information, job design, human-system-
interface, task environment, workplace design and operator characteristics. Each of these 
factors have attributes A1, A2,………., G3 and these are given in table 6-1. Attributes will 
be rated on a constructed scale with very poor on the lower side and excellent as the 
highest rating. While carrying out an assessment it is possible to see which of eight areas is 
rated as lacking or inadequate. 
 
 
Operator characteristics 
Information 
Human System Interface
Task Environment 
Workplace Design 
A1 
A2 
A3 
A4 
A5 
B1 
B2 
B3 
B4 
B5 
D1
D2 
D3 
D4 
D5 
E1
E2 
E3 
E4 
E5 
.....................................................................................
Outstanding Very poor 
=Attributes are rated on a constructed scale= 
Organisation 
G1 
G2 
G3 
F1
F2 
F3 
HF quality index
Job Design 
C1
C2 
C3 
C4 
LEVEL I 
 LEVEL II 
 
Nominal HEP
Reduced HEP Increased HEP 
NB: See table 6-1 definition for definition of A1, A2, A3,…..,G3
 
Figure 7-1: Hierarchical decomposition of human and organisational factors 
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This rating is desirable for decision-making purposes. The management will have a clear 
picture of the areas that need more resources for improvement. If the entire plant is rated 
as excellent then it will be reasonable to assume that the probability of operator error is 
reduced.  
 
Although literature research revealed factors and respective attributes illustrated in table 6-
1 and on fig 7-1, it is worth noting that some might have been left out. In addition, some 
analysts might feel that some of the attributes have been placed under a wrong factor or 
have been named differently. A refinement of this AHP structure will be recommended in 
order to address the above mentioned and other foreseeable shortcomings. The usability 
and validity of this assessment method is illustrated by use of an industrial example where 
the final version of the software was validated. It outlines step by step how an assessor 
would use it to make a decision whether a company has implemented human factors 
within its design and daily operations. 
 
7.1.2 Elicitation of Weights 
 
The purpose of this exercise is to develop a weighting system. The factors affecting the 
quality of human factors are multi-dimensional and therefore need to be ranked to 
determine how they affect the outcome. This weighting method is aimed at eliminating the 
dependence on ad hoc methods that do not adhere to the basic principles.  
 
Operator error is a result of complex inter-relations of factors/attributes indicated on table 
6-1. Each of these factors/attributes has a different weight of influence on operator error 
and this is what these matrices are striving to achieve. This process is repeated for all 
factors/attributes. The relative weights are then calculated before finally calculating the 
consistency ratio. For this purpose, a survey to seek opinion from experts in the industry 
was designed. The survey is described in the sections that follow. 
7.1.2.1 The Questionnaire Formulation 
 
The questionnaire was divided into two parts as shown in appendix B. The judges were 
asked to rate the factors in level I and attributes in level II according to the perceived 
importance towards human error causation. A five point Likert scale was chosen for this 
purpose with “least important = 1” being the lowest and “extremely important = 5” being 
the highest.  
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7.1.2.2 Selection of Judges 
 
The judges or the respondents to the questionnaire were selected from the members of 
PRISM and the European Technology Platform on Industrial Safety (ETPIS). The choice 
was based on the fact that most members have a background on both safety and HF.  Out 
of all the respondents 23 judges were selected. They were distributed across the following 
industries: 9 judges from chemical & petro-Chemical (including pharmaceutical), 4 from 
academic and research institutes, 4 from oil & gas (Upstream), 2 from nuclear and 1 each 
from health, mining, construction and rail. The representation from all industries is to 
make this weighting as diverse as possible. But it should be noted that the number of 
judges from the chemical process industry and oil & gas outclasses the others since the 
focus of this study is on these industries. The average years of experience was 18.52 
(standard deviation, 7.97 and range 4 to 33).  
 
7.1.2.3 Analysis of the results 
 
The degree of importance given to each human factor by all the 24 judges and the author 
is presented in table 7-1. The weighting was very close for all judges except in few cases 
where the standard deviation was beyond 1. The first case where standard deviation was 
high (1.34) was in “Human factors and Safety Policy”. Major difference was contributed by 
judge 1, judge 11 and judge 13 who weighted this factor in the category of least important. 
An explanation to this could be because judge 1 comes from the health industry and 
therefore the approach to safety may differ from that of the chemical process industry.  
 
Judge 13 is a contractor to the oil and gas industry.  There has always been a bone of 
contention between the contractors and the industry especially in the organisational 
matters. Contractors are sometimes seen as safety threats because they often view safety 
measures laid down by the industries as hindrances to their effective work. Therefore, 
when weighting the organisational matters it is expected that a contractor will tend to be 
biased.   
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Table 7-1: Judges Weighting of the HF Spectrum  
            Judge                
  Author 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Average 
STD  
Deviation 
Organisation &  management  5 2 4 5 5 5 2 3 5 5 5 3 4 4 5 2 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4.08 1.00 
Information  3 3 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 4 5 3 4 3 5 4 4 3.71 0.73 
Job Design   3 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 5 3 5 4 4 4 3 4 2 4 3 5 3 4 3.63 0.75 
Human System Interface  4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 4 3 5 2 5 4 3 3 4 4 4 3.63 0.75 
Task Environment  3 3 3 4 2 4 3 2 1 4 4 4 2 2 2 5 2 4 2 3 4 5 2 2 3.00 1.08 
Workplace Design  3 5 3 4 2 4 3 5 1 4 4 3 4 4 2 5 3 3 2 3 3 5 3 2 3.33 1.07 
Operator Characteristics  2 2 5 3 4 5 4 4 3 4 4 2 3 5 4 4 1 3 2 5 5 5 5 4 3.67 1.18 
                             
Human factors and safety policy 5 1 2 4 5 4 3 4 3 4 3 1 4 1 3 5 4 4 5 4 3 4 3 5 3.50 1.22 
Organisational culture 3 2 4 5 5 5 4 3 4 5 5 4 2 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 5 3.83 0.94 
Management of change 4 2 3 3 4 3 4 2 5 5 5 4 2 3 4 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 3.67 0.99 
Organisational learning (audit & 
reviews) 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 5 3.50 0.71 
Line management & supervision 3 3 3 3 5 4 4 5 1 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 4 4 5 3.79 0.87 
                            
Training  4 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 3 5 5 3 4 5 5 3 4.08 0.70 
Procedures & procedure development 3 3 3 5 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 3 3 3 5 3 3 3.58 0.70 
Communication  4 3 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 3 4 4 5 4 4 4.13 0.53 
Labels & signs  2 4 1 3 4 4 3 3 2 3 3 1 2 4 2 4 4 5 3 4 4 3 3 2 3.04 1.02 
Documentation  2 3 2 3 4 3 3 2 3 4 4 1 5 4 3 4 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 3.17 0.99 
                            
Staffing  2 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 5 3 3 4 4 5 3 2 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 3.42 0.81 
Shifts & overtime  2 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 5 2 2 3 3 5 2 3 3 4 4 4 3.33 0.90 
Manual handling.  2 3 1 3 4 3 4 4 1 3 3 1 4 3 1 3 2 3 1 2 4 5 2 2 2.67 1.14 
                            
Design of controls  4 4 2 4 3 4 4 3 2 5 2 4 4 4 3 5 2 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.42 0.91 
Displays  4 4 2 3 3 5 3 3 5 4 2 3 5 4 4 5 3 5 4 3 3 3 4 3 3.63 0.90 
Field Control Panels 4 4 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 2 3 4 4 3 5 2 5 2 3 2 3 4 3 3.21 0.91 
Tools (hand)  4 3 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 2 1 5 4 2 4 2 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 3.29 0.93 
Equipment & valves 4 4 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 2.96 0.79 
                            
Lighting  2 2 3 4 3 4 3 3 2 3 2 2 5 2 2 4 3 4 2 4 4 5 3 4 3.13 0.97 
Temperatures  2 2 3 4 2 4 4 5 1 3 2 3 4 2 2 4 3 3 2 4 4 5 2 4 3.08 1.08 
Noise  2 2 4 3 2 3 4 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 2 4 4 3 2 4 4 5 4 4 3.17 1.11 
Vibration  2 2 4 3 2 3 4 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 2 4 4 3 2 4 4 5 4 4 3.17 1.11 
Toxicity  2 1 3 3 2 3 3 5 5 3 4 1 5 3 2 4 2 4 1 5 5 5 2 4 3.21 1.35 
                            
Facility Layout  3 4 3 4 2 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 1 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 3 4 3.21 0.76 
Workstation configuration 3 5 2 4 2 3 3 3 2 3 4 4 5 3 2 4 2 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3.21 0.87 
Accessibility  3 4 2 4 3 4 2 4 1 3 3 2 5 3 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 3 3.21 0.96 
Control Room  2 5 2 4 2 5 3 3 2 3 4 4 5 3 2 4 3 5 3 4 4 4 3 4 3.46 1.00 
                            
Attention/ motivation 2 4 5 3 5 5 3 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 4.33 0.80 
Fitness for duty  4 4 3 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 4 3 5 3 3 5 3 3 3 3 5 5 4 5 3.67 0.85 
Skills and knowledge 3 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 3 2 4 3 5 5 5 4 4.25 0.83 
 
 
7.1.2.4 Normalising Weights assigned by Judges’ Using AHP 
 
The first step is to convert the Likert scale used for the questionnaire to matrices of 
pairwise comparison. Let’s take an example using table 7-2, which are results obtained 
from judge 8. The judge weighted both “Task Environment” and “Workplace design” in 
the category of least important. Since both of them fall in the same level then they are 
“equally important” (see table 5-1). “Information” is moderately more important than “job 
design” because it (information) falls one level higher. “Organisation & management” has 
been weighted as extremely important when compared with “task environment” or 
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“workplace design”. A matrix of pairwise comparison obtained from table 7-2 is shown in 
table 7-3. 
 
Table 7-2: An Example from the Questionnaire Response 
 Least 
important 
Important Moderately 
important 
Highly 
important 
Extremely 
important 
Organisation and 
management  
     
Information       
Job Design       
Human System Interface       
Task Environment       
Workplace Design       
Operator Characteristics       
 
 
Table 7-3: Matrix of Pair-wise Comparison using AHP 
 ORG INFO JD HSI TE WD OP Relative Weight 
ORG 1 3 5 3 9 9 5 0.39 
INFO  1 3 1 7 7 3 0.19 
JD   1 1/3 5 5 1 0.09 
HSI    1 7 7 3 0.19 
TE     1 1 1/5 0.03 
WD      1 1/5 0.03 
OP       1 0.09 
Consistency index 0.04 
 
This exercise was repeated for all the factors and attributes as weighted by the judges. 
Matrices of pair-wise comparison are developed for the factors and their respective 
attributes. These factors/attributes are compared against each other to determine the 
relative importance. A total of 8 matrices were produced for each judge. One matrix 
corresponding to level I of the hierarchy and 7 matrices for level II. The matrices were 
found to be relatively consistent with the consistency ratio ranging from 0 to 0.06. The 
relative weights for each factor and attribute obtained from the matrices of pair-wise 
comparison were averaged to obtain the mean relative weights. These are illustrated in 
appendix B tables, B-3 and table B-4. Table 7-4 illustrates the results obtained for the 
factors/attributes that need to be considered while assessing the quality of human factors 
in a given facility. The weights are important aid to decision making on where more effort 
or resources should be directed.  Global weight is obtained by combining the relative 
weights down a branch of the hierarchy. These are illustrated graphically in figure 7-2. 
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Attention/ motivation has emerged the attribute with the highest weight. The judges feel 
that this particular attribute contribute to most human errors and consequently to most 
incidents in the process industry.  
 
Table 7-4: Relative and Global Weights of Critical Human Factors and Attributes 
Factors Relative Weight Attribute Relative weight Global Weight
Organisation 0.21 HF Policy 0.17 0.036 
  Organisational culture 0.24 0.051 
  Management of change 0.20 0.042 
  Organisational learning (audit & reviews) 0.16 0.033 
    Line management & supervision 0.22 0.047 
Information 0.14 Training 0.27 0.038 
  Procedures & procedure development 0.18 0.025 
  Communication 0.27 0.038 
  Labels & signs 0.14 0.019 
    Documentation 0.14 0.020 
Job design 0.13 Staffing 0.38 0.049 
  Shifts & overtime 0.40 0.051 
    Manual handling. 0.23 0.029 
Human System Interface 0.13 Design of controls 0.22 0.029 
  Displays 0.26 0.034 
  Field control panels 0.18 0.023 
  Tools (hand) 0.20 0.027 
    Equipment & valves 0.14 0.018 
Task Environment 0.09 Lighting 0.19 0.017 
  Temperatures 0.19 0.017 
  Noise 0.19 0.017 
  Vibration 0.18 0.016 
    Toxicity 0.25 0.022 
Workplace Design 0.13 Facility layout 0.25 0.032 
  Workstation configuration 0.24 0.031 
  Accessibility 0.27 0.036 
    Control Room 0.24 0.031 
Operator Characteristics 0.18 Attention/ motivation 0.42 0.076 
  Fitness for duty 0.21 0.038 
    Skills and knowledge 0.37 0.066 
 
Lack of attention/motivation by the operator is usually a symptom of a deeper problem. 
Errors caused by lack of attention/motivation are due to lack of situation awareness, 
failure to detect information or operator memory slips/lapses. If the human system 
interface is inadequately designed, then information presented to the operator does not 
provide the entire situation awareness. It is therefore hard to interpret results especially 
during emergency situations. If procedures are unclear then they could also contribute to 
such errors. Training plays a major role in preventing or reduction errors due to lack of 
attention. Also factors like personnel selection, monitoring and performance evaluation 
contribute to attention/motivation when not adequately done. Performance evaluation 
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helps to detect where training is needed most.  When designing error prevention strategies 
focus should be on these underlying factors. 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Resulting HF Global Weights (A1, A2….., G3 are defined in Table 6-1 on pg 61) 
 
Another area given high weighting is “skills and knowledge”. Lack of proper skills and 
knowledge is contributed by lack of proper training. If proper training is not provided or is 
infrequently provided then errors due to lack of skills and knowledge could be common. 
Similarly “organisational culture” has received a reasonably high weighting.  
 
“Shifts & overtime” was also rated high because it is felt that it contributes to operator 
stress and fatigue.  It is also noted that the shifts handover contribute to a high number of 
errors that could lead to accidents. An example was the Piper Alpha disaster described 
earlier. 
 
The next step is to develop a rating system. It is the tool to be used by the assessor to 
valuate various facility attributes. The rating value obtained is to be multiplied by 
respective global weight of this attribute. The separate contributions of each attribute to 
the overall objective (score) are considered to be additive. That is, the overall human 
factors quality index, HFQi is defined as the sum of products of all individual attribute’s 
weight and their respective performance measures also referred to as rating. (Kariuki and 
Löwe, 2005): 
 
HFQi =  ∑
=
n
i
iii xv
1
)(ω        (7.1)
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Where, )( ii xv  is a value function of attribute ix  represented by a rating (also referred to as 
performance measure) ir . HFQi is a cardinal numerical score. The score trades off 
different levels of performance among attributes in a compensatory way, by using the 
cardinal weight ωi calculated using matrices of pair-wise comparison and by characterising 
each attribute numerically.   
 
The attributes ix  of the facility being assessed are rated using a five-point Likert scale. 
Likert scale is type of a psychometric response scale often used in questionnaires and is the 
most widely used in survey research. These rates are the performance measures of the 
plant (facility) and they indicate the general characteristics in terms of operability and 
maintainability. High operability and maintainability means consistency of errorless task 
performance. The better they are the higher the HFQi and therefore the lesser the risk. 
The ratings are represented by r1, r2, ..…,rn and are assigned a scale 1 – 5, where 1 
represents the worst performance measure and 5 represents the best, see fig 6-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-3: Five-point scale for rating attributes 
 
The rating of the attributes is guided by a series of questions that have been developed. 
The questions cover all the 30 human factors attributes, A1, A2, …., G3. They are 
structured in a way that they do not attract a simple yes/no answer. Attached to each 
answer is supporting evidence to strengthen the answer given. Evidently the rating exercise 
may be characterised by biasness if one assessor is used. To reduce this weakness more 
than one analyst should carry out this task.  
 
These rates are multiplied by the global weights before finally adding the weighted scores 
to achieve the overall objective. If a company attained a maximum score in all areas then 
the HFQi assumes a value of 1. Any other score is a fraction of this maximum value. The 
range of various human factors quality indices is tabulated in table 7-5.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Excellent Good Average Fair Poor 
Fails to 
meet any 
standards
Meets all/most 
standards 
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Table 7-5: Overall range of human factors quality index 
 
Human Factors Quality Index Description of HFQi 
More than 90% Excellent 
77.6% – 90% Above average 
60.6% – 77.5% Good, Average 
46%  –  60.5% Below Average 
45% or less Poor 
 
 
7.2 Human Factors Assessment Technique Software 
 
Based on the above background computer interface was designed and built to guide and 
help the user through the assessment (Vadillo, 2006). The computer programme also 
calculates automatically the score of the plant, company or industry under assessment. The 
programme was written in Excel using Visual Basic Language. Excel was considered 
sufficient because it had computing capabilities to cover the needs for this particular task. 
Mathematical algorithms were programmed for calculating the weighting factors of each 
one of the attributes and the overall human factors quality. Then a user interface was 
designed. This user interface consists of eight input datasheets (one for each group of 
human factors) and three output datasheets. 
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7.2.1 How to Use the Programme 
 
The programme is called PIHFAT (Process Industry Human Factors Assessment 
Technique).  
 
 
Figure 7-4: User Interface “Organisation” 
 
There are seven input datasheets, one for each group of human factors. We take 
“Organisation” as an example. On this page all the attributes under the factor 
“Organisation are shown, A1 to A5. Under each attribute is a rating question e.g. “How 
good is management of change in this company”. It is clear that this question cannot be 
answered with a no or yes and that is where the scale of “Poor” to “Excellent” applies. On 
the same worksheet there is a “rating help” icon. It provides additional questions that 
guide the assessor in making his/her decision. The assessor is also provided with an 
opportunity to write any observations made during the assessment procedure. This is done 
by clicking on the “write remarks”.  
 
After all the input fields have been made the assessor can go to the worksheet “results”. It 
has two modes of outputs. The first is numerical output which shows the HFQi as a 
percentage (see figure 7-6) and this can be interpreted using table 7-5.  
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Figure 7-5: User Interface “Results” 
 
By clicking on “comments” the author would see the rating by each attribute and the 
corresponding interpretation of each score. There is a possibility to display the results 
graphically. This shows how each attribute has faired in the rating. From figure 7-6 it is 
visible that “staffing”, “schedules, shifts and overtime” and “design of controls” have 
scored poorly and therefore focus on improvement should be directed to them. 
 
 
 
Figure 7-6: User interface “Graphical Output” 
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7.3 Integrating human factors into QRA 
 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous part was concerned with assessing the whole HF spectrum. But during the 
QRA we are concerned only with factors that affect the operator performance of a 
particular task, otherwise known as PIFs. Once a potential human error event has been 
identified, the factors that could influence its occurrence are identified and quantified. 
Each factor identified will be assigned a weight iω′ , which represents how much it 
contributes towards human error occurrence. This new weight is calculated as shown in 
Table 7-7 on page 91. The weights help to calculate human factors modification index 
which is used to adjust the nominal human error probability to reflect the plant conditions. 
The procedure can be summarised as shown in figure 7-7.  
 
The building block for this method is the existing risk analysis methods. Fault tree as has 
been mentioned earlier will be used. To undertake a QRA the probability of initiating 
events and the basic events need to be assigned. For example “operator fails to close 
valve”.  There is a shortage of HEPs data and the ones that exist is plagued with high 
uncertainty. Introducing plant specific factors is to try and reduce this uncertainty. This is 
especially useful in cases where the probability ranges have been generated by use of 
expert judgment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-7: Modification of Human Error Probabilities by use of weighted performance influencing factors. 
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7.3.2 Calculating the human factors modification indices  
 
From weights iω′ and performance measures ir′ , the human factors modification index for 
each human error event is calculated. The factors affecting initiating or basic events are 
identified before the quantification process starts. The factors influencing human 
performance have been identified as organisation, information, job design, human 
machine interface, task environment, workplace design and operator characteristics and 
these are illustrated on figure 7-1 (pg 76) and each of these has accompanying attributes. 
Revisiting the fault tree, it was found that the following basic and initiating events have 
human error events in then:   
 
B1: Insufficient Volume in Tank;  
B2: Level Alarm fails or ignored;  
B3: Wrong Material Fed into Tank;  
B4: Truck Tank not sampled before unloading and  
B5: Unloading Frequency. 
 
For the event, “insufficient volume in tank”, the following were identified as the 
influencing factors:  
-Procedures 
-Documentation 
-Training  
-Checks  
-Displays 
 
For the other events the influencing HF are tabulated in table 6-2.  All influencing factors 
should be identified for each error event. A weighting system is developed for the factors 
behind each human error event identified. A combination of weighting factors and 
performance measure will constitute what we have defined as human factors modification 
index: 
 
Human modification factors index,   
 
β = 11r′′ω  + 22r′′ω + ………..+ nnr′′ω   
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      ∑
=
′′=
n
i
iir
1
ω      (7.2) 
Where iω′= weight of each attribute behind a human error event. 
 ir′= Value function (performance measure) of attribute xi. 
 
β  is important in adjusting the nominal/ base rate HEPs to reflect the specific conditions 
of a plant. The aim is to reduce uncertainty in HEPs as much as possible. The uncertainty 
range is described by error factor EF in most HRA methods e.g. THERP (Swain and 
Guttman, 1983), HEART (Williams, 1986) and CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998). In this method, 
human error data from these sources (mainly from Swain) is going to be used. In addition 
values from expert judgment may be also be used in some cases. Error factor is defined as 
the square root of the upper to the lower uncertainty bounds/ limits. This uncertainty 
range is contributed by the fact that each HEP estimate is associated with some degree of 
uncertainty and therefore is represented by a distribution rather than a single point 
estimate. The distribution of HEPs is assumed to be lognormal because performance of 
skilled personnel tends to be skewed towards the low HEP end of HEP distribution. The 
nominal probability is considered to be the mean of lognormal distribution. It represents 
the condition where the plant conditions lies within the industry average. A selected range 
of HEPs is shown in table 7-6. 
 
Table 7-6: A selected HEPs ranges for different human error events 
 
Human Error  Nominal 
HEP 
Error 
Factor 
HEP Distribution 
Range 
General error rate given very high stress levels and activities are 
occurring rapidly  
0.3 3 0.1 – 0.9 
Inspector fails to detect undesired position of valve during walk 
round inspection 
0.5 3 0.1 - 1 
Incorrect installation of O ring 0.07 5 0.01 – 0.35 
Failure to follow instructions 0.07 5 0.01 – 0.35 
Improperly adjusting mechanical linkage 0.02 10 0.002 – 0.2 
General human error of omission e.g. failure to return manually 
operated test valve to proper configuration after maintenance  
0.01 10 0.001 – 0.1 
Incorrect reading of gauge 0.005 10 0.0005 – 0.05 
Installation of wrong size of line orifice, incorrect hose 
connection, incorrect tightening of bolts or nut. 
0.005 10 0.0005 – 0.05 
General human error of commission e.g. selecting a wrong switch 0.003 10 0.0003 – 0.03 
Omission of action embedded in a procedure 0.003 10 0.0003 – 0.03 
Failure to close valve properly 0.0015 10 0.00015 – 0.015 
Failure to take action, failure to observe audible alarm 0.0003 10 0.00003 – 0.003 
 
The lognormal model used by Swain is multiplicative and only mathematically correct to a 
first application. Lets consider, for instance, the error probability of 0.5 (EF = 3). The 
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actual value of the upper bound is 1.5 but as we know the maximum probability value is 1. 
It is possible to reduce this shortcoming by introducing an odds ratio which is considered 
more mathematically correct. 
 
 Lets the probability of failure be denoted by P, such that the success probability Q = 1 – 
P. Therefore odds ratio Y = Q/P. The uncertainty can be modeled using true 
multiplicative variable  
 
 p = 1/ (1 + y) = 1/ (1 + ex) 
 
Here: 
Y = Lognormally distributed variable where y = (1 – p) / p as the median with EF as the 
uncertainty factor 
p = point estimate of human error probability referred to as nominal human error 
probability in Swain’s Handbook. 
EF = uncertainty/ error factor of p (obtained from the handbook) 
X = normally distributed variable with yln=μ  and 645.1/)(lnEF=σ  
Lets take the case where probability of failure p = 0.5, then the odds ratio will acquire a 
value y = 1. It is indicated that the EF from Swain’s handbook , EF = 5. The lower bound 
(LB) and upper bound (UB)  for this example can then be calculated as follows: 
 
LB = 1 / (1 + y*EF) = 1 / (1 + 1*5) = 0.17 
UB = 1 / (1 + y/EF) = 1 / 1 + 1/5) = 0.83  
 
This model is more exact because the point estimates from Swains Handbook are actually 
median values for a lognormal distribution. In this type of distribution the mean is usually 
larger than the median and therefore it would be inaccurate to take the nominal HEP as 
the mean of a lognormal distribution.  
 
Since the aim is to reduce the uncertainty margin to reflect the current plant conditions, 
the adjustment is done using the following formula. 
 
βΘ= 10UBcalculated HEPHEP     (7.3) 
 
Where, Θ = Log HEPLB – Log HEPUB and 
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HEPUB and HEPLB are the upper limit /bound and lower limit / bound human 
error probabilities respectively. 
 
See an illustrative example in section 7.3.4 
 
7.3.3 Calculating Weights 
 
The weights iω′are calculated from results achieved from the questionnaire. Table 7-4 
shows the weights when comparing the whole HF spectrum. But in this case when 
calculating weights we are concerned with the factors that directly influence the human 
error event under consideration. These factors are identified using the procedure described 
on section 6.6. Weights are selected from table 7-4 and then normalised. This is an 
advantage of this method. It allows combination of different factors to be calculated to 
suit specific scenarios.  We revisit the basic events that contribute to the spill of 
hydrocarbon as described using the fault tree. These are tabulated on table 7-7 and it can 
be observed that weights have been calculated depending on the event under 
consideration.  
 
Table 7-7: Basic events with human error event 
 
 Identified Influencing 
factors 
Weights from table 
7-4 
Normalised 
weights, ω′ i 
Basic event 1 Procedures 0.025 0.15 
Insufficient volume in tank Documentation 0.020 0.12 
 Training 0.038 0.23 
 Supervision checks 0.047 0.29 
 Displays 0.034 0.21 
  Sum = 0.164 Sum = 1 
Basic event 2 Displays 0.034 0.13 
High level alarm fails or ignored Lighting 0.017 0.06 
 Accessibility 0.036 0.14 
 Attention / Motivation 0.076 0.28 
 Skills and Knowledge 0.066 0.25 
  Sum =0.267  Sum = 1 
Basic event 3 Documentation 0.020 0.10 
Wrong material in tank Labels & signs 0.019 0.10 
 Supervision Checks 0.047 0.23 
 Attention/Motivation 0.076 0.38 
 Fitness for duty 0.038 0.19 
  Sum = 0.2 Sum = 1 
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7.3.4 Rating the attributes of a facility and adjusting the HEPs 
 
The performance measure, ir′ is obtained by carrying out an audit. When doing an audit it 
is recommended that the whole human factors spectrum be covered. From such an audit it 
will be possible to pick any ir′ . The procedure for obtaining the performance measure 
value is the same as that described in section 7.1.2.4 on page 83. The performance 
measures are then combined with the normalised weights, iω′ to obtain the HF 
modification indices, β . This is what will be used to adjust the respective nominal or base 
HEPs. For the purpose of quantification and adjustment of HEPs, the scale to be used is 
going to be a little different from the one on fig 6-3. It remains a five-point Likert scale 
but in this case excellent conditions assume 1 and poor assume 0. Average conditions will 
be assigned 0.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-8: The scale showing human factors rating 
 
The basic event “Insufficient volume in tank” has the influencing factors procedures, 
documentation, training, supervision and displays and these are tabulated on table 6-6. The 
respective weights are also shown. This type of human error event is a typical error of 
omission with a probability range between 0.01 (EF=10). Using odds ratio: 
 
y = (1-p) / p = (1-0.01) / 0.01 = 99 
LB = 1 / (1 + y.EF) = 1/991 = 0.001 
UB = 1 / (1 + y/EF) = 1 / 10.9 = 0.09 
 
If we set the rating for all factors to be excellent (1) and poor (0) then β  will be 1 and 0 
respectively. 
  
i.e.  β  = (0.15 + 0.12 + 0.23 + 0.29 + 0.21) x 1 = 1 
and  (0.15 + 0.12 + 0.23 + 0.29 + 0.21) x 0 = 0 
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 
Excellent Good Average Fair Poor 
Fails to 
meet any 
standards
Meets all/most 
standards 
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Using equation 7.3 it can be shown that HEPcalculated under these conditions is 0.09 when all 
factors are rated poor and 0.001 when all the factors are rated excellent.  
 
β)09.0log001.0(log10*09.0 −=calculatedHEP  
Where, β  = 0 or 1 
 
A representation of how the HEP varies (0.001 – 0.09) with the change in HF conditions 
(from poor to excellent) is illustrated in fig 7-9. It is seen that when the human factors 
conditions change from poor to fair the HEP reduces from 0.09 to 0.03 and from poor to 
average it improves from 0.09 to 0.009. In this case all human factors ratings are held 
constant in each case.  
 
 
 
Figure 7-9: Distribution of Human Error Probability depending on the influencing factors 
 
Revisiting the fault tree, it was earlier mentioned that the minimum cutset with the greatest 
influence on the top event is contain basic events B1, B2 and B5. The HEP range for B1 
(0.001 – 0.09) has been described above. The same case applies to event B2 since both 
have the same nominal HEP. Event B5 (Frequency = 300/yr) will be assumed to remain 
constant since this depends on the number of times the tank is loaded. It may not be 
included in the error reduction strategy because it would be difficult to influence the 
number of unloading per year. It is dependent on operational requirements and therefore 
beyond the boundaries of hazard analysis. 
 
We will use results of an analysis done on two facilities (Kariuki and Löwe, 2006) to 
calculate the human factors indices, β  for each of the two basic events B1 and B2. This is 
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done using equation 7.2 and results are tabulated on table 7-8. It is seen that the factors 
associated with the occurrence of the human error events, B1 and B2 are below industry 
average for facility A while those for facility B are above the industry average.  
 
Table 7-8: Calculation of human factors index for two facilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using equation 7.3, for both basic events Θ = -2. 
Taking basic event 1,  
HEPcalculated = 0.012 for facility A and 0.002 for facility B.  
For basic event 2,  
HEPcalculated = 0.024 for facility A and 0.01 for facility B. 
 
Let us look at the implications of this analysis. The original FTA has used the industry 
mean. That is, the logarithmic mean of the probability distribution. In this case the cutset 
B1.B2.B5 = 3 x 10-2/yr. In our analysis the plant specific conditions have been introduced. 
The results have shown a very big difference between the value of the same cutset in 
facility A and facility B. For facility A the cutset B1.B2.B5 = 8.6 x 10-2/yr.  
 Identified Influencing 
 factors 
Normalised 
 weights, iω′
Facility A, 
ir′   
Facility B, 
ir′  
Basic event 1  Procedures 0.15 1 1 
Insufficient volume in tank Documentation 0.12 1 1 
(HEP range = 0.001 – 0.09) Training 0.23 0.5 1 
 Supervision checks 0.29 0.25 0.5 
 Displays 0.21 0 1 
   β =0.46 β =0.86 
Basic event 2 Displays 0.13 0 1 
High level alarm fails or ignored Lighting 0.06 0.25 0.25 
(HEP range = 0.001 – 0.09) Accessibility 0.14 0.25 0.75 
 Attention / Motivation 0.28 0.25 0.25 
 Skills and Knowledge 0.25 0.75 0.75 
   β =0.31 β =0.51 
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Figure 7-10: Comparison of a minimum cutset for different facilities 
 
Had the industry average been taken for this facility the risk could have been 
underestimated by a factor of close to 3. The same cutset has a value of 6 x 10-3/yr in 
facility B. For risk reduction strategies it is clear that displays require special attention for 
facility A. Also the factors that affect attention and motivation should be addressed since 
this attribute has a big weight.  
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In this work the application of Human factors as a way of reducing unwanted events was 
discussed. It has been made clear that there are existing laws and regulations, specifically, 
SEVESO II directive that calls for the implementation of human factors as a way of 
reducing risk. However, as part of this work a study was carried out within the European 
chemical process industry and results showed that most companies are still at the lower 
capability level when it comes to understanding and implementing HF. Obstacles 
hindering the achievement of this goal were identified. One of the identified obstacles was 
lack of a systematic method to include HF in the quantitative risk analysis. This is what 
this work has achieved. 
 
Human reliability analysis (HRA) is a subject that has been under discussion for a very 
long time. Scarcity of human error probability (HEP) data and uncertainty in the existing 
data have deterred the HRA methods to reach there maturity when compared to reliability 
analysis methods for technical systems. In the chemical process industry the sources of 
HEP data are mainly from the nuclear industry and expert judgement. And as long as the 
shortage of HEP data continues these two sources of data will remain useful. When 
carrying out a standard quantitative risk analysis, the practice is to take the nominal HEP 
as the best estimate.  This in some cases leads to either under or overestimation of risk. 
The major concerns are when the risk is underestimated. It has been argued in this work 
that the inclusion of plant specific conditions will reduced the uncertainty that 
characterises the HEPs. 
 
The new method was accomplished in two phases. First, a computer-based assessment 
tool called Process Industry Human Factors Assessment Technique (PIHFAT) was 
developed. PIHFAT can be used as a standalone HF auditing tool for auditing the quality 
of HF in a given plant. The basis of this tool was a classification of HF which consisted of 
breaking down the whole spectrum into 30 attributes. From these attributes a set of audit 
questions was formulated and this became the evaluation manual in this work. The 
classification of HF spectrum was done in consultation with the industry. The main 
contributors were the petro-chemical and offshore industries because they have a relatively 
mature HF culture.  
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PIHFAT produces quantified results and this was achieved through analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP). AHP belongs to the family of multi-attribute decision analysis methods. 
The choice of AHP as the quantification tool was because of two reasons. First, this 
method has been used for many years as a decision analysis tool in various fields and has 
achieved sound results. It has been a very powerful tool to solve problems involving 
subjective reasoning. Its ability to measure consistency in subjective reasoning makes it 
desirable to solve HF problems where many factors and attributes are involved. Secondly, 
it is simple to apply and therefore was appropriate for a task that involves the industry. 
The author has the experience that many industries shun away from techniques as they get 
more complex.  
 
PIHFAT was validated in the industry and it posted very impressive results. The time of 
actual validation exercise, discussions and documenting the results was five working days 
which was found to be justifiable. This was a remarkable observation because it was 
initially thought that the number of questions were not manageable. This tool is now 
available and could be used by both internal auditors and the authorities to assess the HF 
maturity levels in a given plant. Nevertheless, some suggestions were made to improve this 
tool. It was felt firstly, that the classification should be made broader to include the wider 
process industry and secondly, that more validations should be carried out.  
 
In the second part HF were introduced into quantitative risk analysis using a newly 
developed procedure. It has also been argued in this work that introducing these factors 
will increase the accuracy of human error probabilities. In this case it means making HEPs 
better or worse, depending on the audit results. Here the accident modelling technique 
that has been chosen is fault tree. The unwanted event is deductively broken down into 
basic events and the ones that contain human error events are determined. After these 
events have been identified the underlying causes are investigated. A procedure to identify 
and analyse underlying HF causes was developed. It was clear that the underlying factors 
have different weightings and with the help of AHP a weighting system for these factors 
was developed.  Combination of the weightings and the audit result for each factor was 
used to calculate the human factors modification index, which in turn is used to modify 
the HEPs. The effectiveness of this approach was demonstrated by use of a case study. It 
was shown that in one case the frequency of top event was underestimated by a factor 
close to 3.  
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It is worth mentioning that the weighting system used here was obtained from results of a 
survey held throughout European chemical process industry. The use of representatives 
from the industry brought practical sense in this work. 
 
This work has achieved three aims. Firstly, a technique to assess human factors which has 
been presented in computer-based format has been developed. Secondly, a newly 
developed procedure to systematically analyse underlying human factors in each human 
error event has been illustrated. Finally the work has laid the basis for reducing the 
uncertainty in HEPs. The HEP data from standard methods, especially THERP and 
expert judgement are the ones used in almost all HRA. The introduction of the HF 
modification index, which was defined in this work, brings in a structured and systematic 
way of adjusting the HEP to reflect the actual conditions of a facility or system. 
 
This work achieved the desired results. Nevertheless, the following are recommended for 
future studies:  
 
a. Refinement of AHP hierarchy 
 
The author feels that a further refinement is needed to group HF.  The classification 
obtained in this work is mainly from the petro-chemical industry. The area that needs 
more investigation is the degree of automation because this will definitely affect the human 
system interface. And in turn it will affect the degree of training. A further 
recommendation here is to explore the applicability of fuzzy logic as an optimisation tool. 
 
b. Classification of tasks 
 
While carrying out the survey, some respondents felt that it is more practical to classify 
tasks e.g. tests and calibration, inspection, maintenance and repair, operation and 
emergency tasks. From here it is possible to identify the factors that influence each group 
and then calculate the weightings using AHP. It was felt that the factors that affect one 
group of tasks do not necessarily have the same weight on another group of tasks. 
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c. Further Validation 
 
Although this method has proved acceptable there is a need to validate it further. It is 
recommended that more studies be done where a complete standard QRA have already 
been done.  
 
d. Use the method to modify hardware induced failures 
 
This study has concentrated on the human induced failures. But there are failures where 
the technical failures are induced by human errors. It is recommended that further 
investigations be done so that such failure probabilities can be adjusted using these 
methodologies.  
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APPENDIX A: Maturity Levels for Factors and Attributes 
A1: Human factors policy 
 
POOR (level 1): Neither statement of human factors policy nor importance of considering 
human factors is given by the organisation. 
 
FAIR (level 2): There is a general understanding of HF, but not in documented form. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): HF policy exists in a written form, but more looking for legal 
compliance than for continual improvement and therefore is not deep rooted within the 
organisation. 
 
GOOD (level 4): HF policy exists in a written form with clear targets and objectives and it 
is distributed to supervisors, contractors, stakeholders and other people working for or on 
behalf of the organisation. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, HF policy is periodically reviewed and 
revised to reflect the changing conditions and information in order to better look for 
continual improvement. 
 
A2: Organisational and Safety Culture 
 
POOR (level 1): There is a lack of willingness and failure to recognise and/or address 
those issues that might result in poor safety performance. At this stage safety is not taken 
seriously within the company. The safety systems in place are to fulfil the legal obligations 
only. It is very normal to hear statements like: “of course we have accidents- this is a 
dangerous business!” Bad news and near misses are ignored.  
 
FAIR (level 2): At this stage safety is taken seriously only when an accident or incident 
occurs. Managers feel frustrated, because they feel the workforce does not do what they 
are told to or supposed to. They feel they have to force compliance. Bad news is not 
ignored at this level, but it is kept hidden. Improvements are only made following a serious 
incident. 
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AVERAGE (level 3): At this stage the organisation feels and knows safety as a very 
important issue. It has safety management systems in place. The organisation is very 
worried about statistics and numbers. A lot of data is collected and analysed and the 
organisation feels comfortable about making changes according to the collected data. The 
main problem here is that root causes of incidents are not investigated.  At this level bad 
news is tolerated but still unwelcome.  
 
GOOD (level 4): The organisation does not only concentrate on what has gone bad in the 
past, but they also try to consider what might go wrong in the future (proactive safety 
management) and prevent it before it occurs by taking the adequate steps and providing 
the necessary resources. At this level the HSE department starts to delegate to the 
workforce line and counts on them and their opinion. Management is open but still too 
much obsessed with statistics. Communication between management and the workforce is 
very good and it is well known where problems are, what is exactly happening in the 
organisation and the workforce knows what is expected of them. That is why the need for 
audits, supervision and bureaucracy decreases in this stage due to an increase in the 
maturity and sense for responsibility of the workforce and the organisation. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): At this level the organisation seeks for continuous improvement. 
They set very high standards and try to reach them: compliance with the minimum 
regulations requirements is not enough for them. Management really knows what is 
happening in the organisation and they are willing to hear what goes wrong, not to blame 
the workforce but to improve. The workforce trusts and reports to the management what 
goes wrong, because they do not fear blame and they know it will be used for 
improvement. At this stage safety is integral to everything that is done and it is seen as a 
profit centre. 
 
A3: Management of change 
 
POOR (level 1): The company does not have a policy for change management. It neither 
plans the change nor assesses its risk nor does it provide the required resources. Change 
and its outcome are not followed up. Employees affected by change are rarely informed 
about the change.   
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FAIR (level 2): There is a general understanding of change management, but there are no 
change management procedures in written form. The timing of the change is not 
systematically planned. Concerned employees have some general information about the 
change. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): There are change management procedures in written form. Change 
timing and required resources are sufficiently planned after identifying people and tasks 
affected by change. Risks of change are roughly assessed, but workload calculations and 
scenario assessment are not done. Concerned employees are adequately informed about 
the change. 
 
GOOD (level 4): Change management policy and procedures exist in written form with 
clear targets, objectives and steps. Change is well planned as long as timing and resources 
are concerned. Risks of change are adequately assessed, including workload calculations 
and scenario assessment. Participation and expertise of employees are welcome while 
planning and implementing the change. Employees are well informed about the change.  
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, change management policy and procedure 
are periodically reviewed and revised depending on the results of the implemented changes 
in order to look for continual improvement of the management of change. 
 
A4: Organisational learning (audit and reviews) 
 
POOR (level 1): The company does not have a policy for organisational learning. 
  
FAIR (level 2): There is a general understanding of organisational learning, but audits and 
reviews exist only to comply with legal and other subscribed requirements. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): Organisational learning policy exists in a written form with clear 
targets and objectives but there is no evidence of the objectivity and independence of the 
auditors. 
 
GOOD (level 4): Organisational learning policy exists in a written form with clear targets 
and objectives with evidence of the objectivity and independence of the auditors. Audits 
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results are important for the management reviews. Enough information and 
documentation are available for management at the review period. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, organisational learning policy and 
procedures are periodically reviewed and revised in order to look for continual 
improvement. Reviews are very complete and they include all decisions and actions leading 
to changes in policy, targets, objectives or management system. 
 
A5: Line management and supervision 
 
POOR (level 1): The company does not have a specific plan or policy for supervision or 
providing with sufficient amount of equipment, protections, material, procedures, and 
personnel.  
 
FAIR (level 2):  There is a general understanding of supervision and line management, but 
there are not any clear definitions of either line management or supervisory roles and 
responsibilities.  
 
AVERAGE (level 3): There is a clear definition of line management and supervisory roles 
and responsibilities, but still resources are not always available or sufficient when required. 
The suitability of people for supervisory roles is not checked and they do not receive a 
specific training on the matter. 
 
GOOD (level 4): There is a clear definition of line management and supervisory roles and 
responsibilities. Resources are available and accessible when required. Suitability of people 
for supervisory roles is checked and they are specifically trained for it. Responsible for line 
management and supervision roles are provided with enough time, support and 
understanding for developing their tasks. Supervision and line management is important 
for the company in order to warrant safety. Supervision arrangements for contractors are 
partially defined. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, supervision and line management are 
frequently evaluated and formally reported in order to improve the way supervision is 
delivered. Supervision arrangements for contractors are defined and supervisory problems 
with contractors are identified, evaluated and solved. 
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A6: Training 
POOR (level 1): The company does not have a training program. Neither supervisors nor 
employees receive training specific to their work. 
 
FAIR (level 2): There is a general training understanding in the company, but a written 
training program as such does not exist. Workers and supervisors receive some training 
but on very general terms. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): There is a written training program, but it is not outlined how the 
training is to be designed, developed or evaluated. Employees and supervisors receive 
adequate training assisted with a written hand out. Special times for training are set. 
 
GOOD (level 4): There is a training program in a written form with clear targets and 
objectives. It outlines how to assess the trainees’ needs and training requirements, as well 
as how to design, develop and evaluate training. The workforce involved in specialised 
operations also receives periodical training to review correct procedures. 
  
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, the training program is periodically 
reviewed and revised in order to be improved. There is also a periodical assessment of 
training needs in order to better plan and implement refreshing training. 
 
A7: Procedures and procedure development 
 
POOR (level 1): Procedures and procedure management do not exist in this company. 
 
FAIR (level 2): There is a general understanding of procedures, but procedures only exist 
to comply with regulation and other obligatory requirements. Procedures exist but no 
much attention is given to their quality or location. Procedures are ambiguous and 
confusing.  
 
AVERAGE (level 3): The company understands procedures as a way of better and safer 
operation, but it still has not matured to a procedure management system as such. There is 
an interest and effort to have procedures cast in a usable form and easy to locate, but this 
has not materialised in a procedure management system yet. 
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GOOD (level 4): The company has a procedure management system, because it wants to 
have procedures cast in a usable form and easy to locate at the workplace. Procedures are 
easy to understand, written in the right language with short and simple commands ordered 
in the logical steps to complete a task successfully. Procedures are updated and have been 
revised to reflect the current state of the plant. The issue of ambiguity have been 
addressed. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, review, evaluation and maintenance of 
procedures is done on a regular basis, including an exhaustive analysis of why procedures 
have not been followed and what can be done to improve them. 
 
A8: Communication 
 
POOR (level 1): Organisational communication in the company is bad. Management is 
unaware of what occurs in the plant and communication between teams and shifts is 
inexistent. As far as technical communication is concerned, the communication equipment 
is not very reliable and messages are often distorted or lost in or during retrieval due to the 
channel or technical aspects.   
 
FAIR (level 2): There is a general understanding of organisational communication. People 
in the team have a general idea to whom they should address, but they are sometimes 
unable to deliver or receive messages on time. Management has a general idea of what 
happens in the plant and there is some communication between shifts and teams, but still 
not at an adequate level. Communication equipment reliability has been improved and 
messages are not distorted or lost due to channel or technical problems.  
 
AVERAGE (level 3): The company has developed a communication system in which team 
components know who is to be addressed in each occasion. Information is generally 
available on time, but now the problem is that too much information is given and it takes 
time to discern the important from the irrelevant. Management wants to know what 
happens in the plant, but it still is not aware of the best moment or means to approach 
workers to acquire this information. Communication between shifts and teams is given 
required importance, but still the means to develop it in an adequate way have not been 
provided yet.  
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GOOD (level 4): Communication is a very important issue in the company. There is an 
effort to transmit only relevant information and team members know exactly to whom 
they must address and for whom they must receive information. Management knows what 
happens in the plant and has an understanding of when and how best to approach workers 
for information. Workers’ opinion is longed for, but it is still hard for workers to express 
their problems to their seniors. Communication between shifts and teams is well 
structured and it occurs in a way of verbal or written reports. Technical communication 
equipment is very reliable. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, communication structure is regularly 
revised in order to look for optimising potential. Communication within the team, 
between teams and shifts and with management is very fluid and the amount and relevance 
of information is at the optimal level. 
 
A9: Labels and signs 
 
POOR (level 1): Labels and signs in the company are not given much importance.  
 
FAIR (level 2): There is a general understanding of the importance of signs and labels, but 
more in the sense that they only exist to comply with regulation and other obligatory 
requirements.  
 
AVERAGE (level 3): The company understands signs and labels as a way for improving 
operations and safety, but it still has no labels and signs management system. There is an 
interest and effort to have signs and labels with an adequate content, placement and layout, 
but there is still no adequate knowledge about the best practice in design of labels and 
signs. It has not yet developed a standard of good sign or label. 
 
GOOD (level 4): The company has a label and signs management system, because it wants 
to have signs and labels with an adequate content, placement and layout. Sign and labels 
are updated and have been revised, so that they are adequately placed. The company 
knows what makes a good label and sign and checks that every label and sign fulfil the 
requirements. Message and symbols are clear, obvious, short, one-meaning and easily and 
universally understood. Layout is adequate that the text is big and wide enough and it can 
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be viewed horizontally, with an adequate contrast in easy to read style and colours. Labels 
and signs are resistant to the environmental conditions. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, review, evaluation and maintenance of signs 
and labels is done on a regular basis, including an exhaustive analysis of why signs and 
labels have not fulfilled their purpose and what can be done to improve them.  
 
A10: Documentation 
 
POOR (level 1): The company does not have any documentation system.  
 
FAIR (level 2): There is a general understanding of documentation, but more in the sense 
that it is done only to comply with regulatory requirements. Documentation is neither easy 
to trace nor complete.  
 
AVERAGE (level 3): The company understands documentation as a way of improving 
and not just achieving compliance with requirements. Documentation management system 
is still undeveloped and it is sometimes difficult to trace important documents. Some 
documents might still be incomplete in some areas.  
 
GOOD (level 4): The company has a good working documentation management system. 
Documentation is well archived and easy to find. It is up to date and it is easy to see the 
documents’ version. It is also easy to find how often they are approved, reviewed and 
revised. Documentation is complete and covers all required areas.  
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, review, evaluation and maintenance of 
documentation and documentation management is done on a regular basis, including an 
analysis of the relevance of the documentation being stored in order to find potential for 
improvement. 
 
A11: Staffing 
 
POOR (level 1): Process demands on personnel number and qualification have not been 
analysed and therefore it is not possible to know if there is a mismatch or not. 
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FAIR (level 2): Process demands on personnel number and qualification have partially 
been determined, but these demands are not sufficiently tackled. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): Process demands on personnel number and qualification have been 
determined and they are normally eliminated, but this is not done systematically. Personnel 
shortage is experienced at some instances and changes in the workload are a problem for 
the company. 
 
GOOD (level 4): Process demands on personnel number and qualification are analysed 
and resolved in a systematic way. Task requirements are matched with the individual skills 
of the employees. But occasionally the company experiences a mismatch between the task 
demands and the number of personnel. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): Process demands on personnel number and qualification have 
been very well determined. Task requirements are matched with the individual skills of the 
employees. These task demands are addressed at all times. 
 
A12: Work schedules, shifts and overtime 
 
POOR (level 1): Shifts are too long and work and breaks are not well scheduled. Overtime 
is normal practice in the company. There are not any dining rooms or food facilities. 
 
FAIR (level 2): There is a general understanding of work schedules and shifts, but workers 
do not participate in the selection of the shifts. Overtime is a common practice in the 
company. Breaks exist, but they are not long enough.  
 
AVERAGE (level 3): The company understands that a good work schedule and shift 
planning is a way for better operation and decreasing the accident rate, but a system for 
evaluating the effects of the shifts and work schedules on the workforce has not been 
developed yet. Workers can participate in the selection of shifts. There are dining rooms or 
warm food facilities. 
 
GOOD (level 4): The company understands that a good work schedule and shift planning 
is a way for better operation and decreasing the accident rate. A system has been 
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developed for evaluating the effects of the shifts and work schedules on the workforce. 
Medical surveillance and incident reports are very much considered when planning shifts 
and work schedules. There are dining rooms or warm food facilities. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, revision and evaluation of work schedules, 
shifts and breaks are done periodically to check if everything is going as planned and if not 
implement the necessary corrective measures. 
 
A13: Manual handling 
 
POOR (level 1): Manual handling is common practice and very intense within the 
company. Moreover loads are very heavy and difficult to handle and they include either 
prolonged or repetitive movements, such as reaching behind the body, kneeling, squatting, 
reaching with hands above the shoulders or with the hands above the elbow or finger-
pinch gripping or hand grasping, rotation of the forearm, and twisting the body or some 
other kind of movement that forces an awkward body position. Worker manual handling 
technique is very health damaging and workers are unaware of the risk it carries. 
 
FAIR (level 2): Manual handling is partially substituted by automation or mechanised, not 
because of its potential accident risk, but because the efficiency or economics of the 
process is improved. It still includes many prolonged or repetitive manual handling or 
hand intensive tasks. Manual handling technique is still health damaging and workers are 
not aware of the risk it carries. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): There is a general understanding of the risk that bad manual 
handling techniques carry and therefore high risk manual handling tasks have been 
mechanised or automated. There are some manual handling standards that the company 
would like to follow, but its implementation in the company has not occurred yet. 
 
GOOD (level 4): The company is aware of the risk involved in manual handling and there 
is a serious effort to substitute high risk manual handling tasks by mechanisation or 
automation. The risk of all manual handling activities and actions that include force, 
repetitive motion and performance in awkward positions has been evaluated. High risk 
actions have been limited. The company has accepted some good practice manual 
Integrating Human Factors into Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis                                           124 
handling standards, which are implemented in the company and followed by the workers, 
because everyone is aware of the risk a bad manual handling carries. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, a revision and evaluation of the manual 
handling task and its risk is done periodically to check if everything is going as planned and 
if not implement corrective measures. 
 
A14: Design of controls 
 
POOR (level 1): The design of controls is in general very poor. There is no consistency of 
controls with the same function across the plant and operator expectations are not 
fulfilled. Controls' dimensions are not adequate and inadvertent activating of controls is 
common.  
 
FAIR (level 2): The design of controls is at an acceptable level in the sense that it allows 
operators send signals to the plant accurately and quick enough. Inadvertent activation of 
controls could occur in some cases, but is quickly detected. Within the plant there are 
controls with same function that are not designed in a consistent way. Controls still do not 
have the adequate dimensions and they do not completely fulfil operators’ expectations. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): The design of controls is at an acceptable level, because it allows 
transmission of accurate signals on time. Inadvertent activation of controls hardly occurs. 
The controls with the same function are consistent across the plant. However, operators’ 
expectations on how to operate controls are not always fulfilled. 
 
GOOD (level 4): The design of controls could be termed as very good, because it allows 
transmission of accurate signals on time. The surface available for controls' installation is 
big enough and the controls' dimensions are adequate. Inadvertent activation of controls 
does not occur any more. The controls with the same function are consistent across the 
plant. Operators’ expectations on how to operate controls are always fulfilled. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, controls are periodically revised to check 
that their design is still at an optimal level and if not implement the necessary corrective 
measures.  
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A15: Displays 
 
POOR (level 1): Visual displays are in general badly designed because they do not show all 
required information about process variables or they contain too much information. They 
cannot be seen from the normal working position due to either a bad location or design of 
the visual display. The alarm system is characterised by too many false alarms. 
 
FAIR (level 2): Visual displays show all required information about process variables and 
parameters, but the display position does not completely match the schema of the process. 
Visual displays can be seen from the normal working position, but the information on the 
display cannot be adequately read due to a bad design of the visual display, such as a too 
small display or a bad selection of colours and other display characteristics. There is a 
working alarm system, but there is still clear no separation between the different levels of 
alarms i.e. normal, caution and critical. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): Quality of visual displays is at an acceptable level, because they show 
all required information about process variables and parameters. The display position 
generally matches the schema of the process. Visual displays can be seen from the normal 
working position, and the information on the display can be adequately read, although the 
design of the visual display could be improved in order to make easier reading information 
(bigger displays or a better selection of colours, brightness, contrast, and information 
presentation by symbols or text). There is an alarm management system, but the level of 
nuisance alarms is still high. 
 
GOOD (level 4): Visual displays are at a very good level, because they show all required 
information about process variables and parameters and the display position matches the 
mental schema of the process. Visual displays can be seen very well from the normal 
working position, and a very good design of the visual display allows reading the 
information on the displays very well. The alarm system can be rated as very good, because 
the company has an alarm management system, which tries to optimise the frequency, 
amount and volume level of alarms in order to reduce operator overload, especially in 
emergency situations.  
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EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, visual and auditory displays are periodically 
revised to check if they are still at an optimal level and if not implement the required 
corrective measures. 
 
A16: Control Panels 
POOR (level 1): The location of controls and displays across the plan and within the field 
of control panel is incoherent and inconsistent according to the rational sequence of use of 
controls in time and in function. Panels and their components are poorly labelled. Most 
frequently used components are difficult to reach. Emergency controls are difficult to 
identify and access. 
 
FAIR (level 2): The design of field control panels is acceptable but the location of controls 
and displays across the plant does not completely match the rational sequence of use of 
controls in time and in function. Panels and their components are labelled, but it is still not 
obvious to realise how the process responds when a control is manipulated. Most 
frequently used controls are in general easy to reach.  
 
AVERAGE (level 3): Location of controls and displays across the plant matches in general 
the rational sequence of use of controls in time and in function. Panels and their 
components are adequately labelled, and it is only in rare exceptions that it is not obvious 
to realise how the process responds when a control is manipulated.  Most frequently used 
controls are easy to identify, but in some cases it is difficult to reach them. Emergency 
controls are easy to identify, but in some cases it is difficult to access them.  
 
GOOD (level 4): Design of field control panels is very good because the location of 
controls and displays across the plant matches the rational sequence of use of controls in 
time and in function. Panels and their components are well labelled, and it is always 
possible to monitor process response when a control is manipulated. Most frequently used 
controls are easy to see and reach. Emergency controls are easy to identify and access.  
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, fields of control panels are periodically 
revised to check that they are still at an optimal level, despite possible changes in the 
process, equipment and panels. 
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A17: Tools 
 
POOR (level 1 Tool availability is very poor and it is difficult to find the needed tools. It is 
common to see operators using elements not specifically designed for the purpose as tools. 
Tool housekeeping is poor and it is common to see unused tools lying on the floors. There 
is no systematic program for tool maintenance. 
 
FAIR (level 2): Tool availability is acceptable, but in some occasions it is still possible to 
see operators using elements not specifically designed for the purpose as tools. Tools are 
mainly properly stored, but difficult to find and access in some cases. Tool maintenance is 
partial and still inadequate and ineffective. 
  
AVERAGE (level 3): Tool availability is very good, in the sense that the required tools are 
in the company, but sometimes the amount of tools is not enough and only in exceptional 
cases operators can be seen using elements not specifically designed for the purpose of 
tools. They are properly stored, and it is only in exceptional cases that tools are hard to 
find and access. Tool maintenance is good, although there is no specific maintenance 
program. 
 
GOOD (level 4): Tool availability is very good, in the sense that the required tools are in 
the company, and it is not possible to see operators using elements not specifically 
designed for the purpose of tools. Tools are properly stored and easy to find and access. 
Tool maintenance is good and there is a specific maintenance program.  
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, a revision and evaluation of tools in the 
plant is done periodically to check that they are still at an optimal level, despite possible 
changes in the process, equipment and plant activities. 
 
A18: Equipment and valves 
 
POOR (level 1): Design and layout of equipment and valves in the company is generally 
inadequate because they are not accessible when wearing working clothes and tools. 
Equipment and valves are poorly labelled and it is very difficult to know what happens 
when a local equipment control is activated or a valve is actuated. Valves are located in 
places hard to reach and to operate. The layout of the piping is very confusing, because 
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there are many unnecessary crossings. There are not any or very few protections that 
prevent people from walking on the piping. There is no systematic program of maintaining 
equipment and valves. 
 
FAIR (level 2): Most frequently used equipment can be easily accessed when wearing 
working clothes and tools. Equipment and valves are labelled, but it is still not obvious to 
realise what happens when a local equipment control is activated or a valve is opened or 
closed. Valve location is acceptable according to the force and position to operate it, but it 
is still possible to find valves located badly. The layout of the piping is sometimes 
confusing, because there are some unnecessary crossings. There are some protections that 
prevent people from walking on the piping. Equipment maintenance is partial, but still 
inadequate and ineffective. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): All equipment is generally accessible in working clothes and wearing 
the required tools. Equipment and valves are adequately labelled, and it is still only in rare 
exceptions that it is not obvious to realise what happens when a local equipment control is 
activated or a valve is opened or closed. Valve location is acceptable according to the force 
and position to operate it, and badly located valves are very rare. The layout of the piping 
is acceptable and the number of unnecessary crossings is minimal. The protections that 
prevent people from walking on the piping are acceptable. Equipment maintenance is 
good, although there is not a specific maintenance program.  
 
GOOD (level 4): Equipment and valves are adequately labelled, and it is always obvious to 
realise what happens when a local equipment control is activated or a valve is opened or 
closed. Valve location is very good according to the force and position to operate it. The 
layout of the piping is acceptable and the number of unnecessary crossings is minimal. The 
protections that prevent people from walking on the piping are excellent. Equipment is 
good and there is a specific maintenance program. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, a revision and evaluation of equipment and 
valves in the plant is done periodically to check if they are still at an optimal level, despite 
possible changes in the process, equipment and plant activities. 
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A19: Illumination 
 
POOR (level 1): Light quantity is definitely inadequate at workplace. Light quality is very 
low because there are many observable points of glare and flicker in many parts of the 
room or points of the day in the workplace. There are no possibilities of adjusting artificial 
light sources to the personnel or the task requirements. 
  
FAIR (level 2): Light quantity and quality are at an acceptable level in the sense that light is 
normally sufficient to adequately perform the task, but it is annoying and discomforting 
due to occasional glare and flickering. There are few possibilities of adjusting the light 
sources to the personnel or task requirements, but definitely not enough. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): Light quantity and quality are at an acceptable level because light is 
adequate for performing the task and it is only in rare occasions that it causes annoyance, 
discomfort or exhaustion. Cases of glare are very rare  and light sources can be adjusted to 
the personnel and task requirements. 
 
GOOD (level 4): Light quantity and quality are at a very good level, because light is very 
adequate for performing the task. Operators feel comfortable to work under these light 
conditions. Light sources can be adjusted very well to the personnel and task requirements. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, light conditions are periodically revised to 
check that they still are at an optimal level, despite changes in the process, plant and 
activities. 
 
A20: Temperature, humidity and wind chill 
 
POOR (level 1): Temperatures at workplace are clearly too high or too low that they cause 
discomfort and annoyance. Protective clothes are unsuitable for the temperature levels at 
the workplace. It is very often, that workers have to stop working because of temperature 
levels, either cold or heat stress. Workers strongly complain about inadequate temperature 
conditions. There are no possibilities of adjusting temperature to the personnel or task 
requirements. 
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FAIR (level 2): Temperatures levels are still annoying and discomforting however tasks can 
be performed but only with many breaks. Workers sometimes have to stop working 
because of inadequate temperature levels, either cold or heat stress. There are few 
possibilities of adjusting temperature to the personnel or the task requirements, but 
definitely not enough. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): Temperature is at an acceptable level in the sense that it is adequate 
for performing the task, and it is only in rare occasions that it causes annoyance, 
discomfort or exhaustion. Protective clothing is designed considering the temperature level 
in the workplace. Workers rarely have to stop working because of inadequate temperature 
levels, either cold or heat stress, but they still sometimes complain about inadequate 
temperature conditions. When possible, temperatures can be adjusted to the personnel and 
task requirements. 
 
GOOD (level 4): Temperatures are maintained at very good level and therefore provide 
good conditions for performing the task. Operators feel comfortable to work under these 
temperature conditions. Temperature can be adjusted very well to the personnel and task 
requirements. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, temperature conditions are periodically 
revised to check that they still are at an optimal level, despite changes in the process, plant 
and activities. 
 
A21: Noise 
 
POOR (level 1): Noise level is definitely inadequate at the workplace and it causes 
discomfort and annoyance and therefore can easily induce errors while performing the 
task. Noise levels exceed the permissible exposure from OSHA standards. Workplace is 
not adapted for noise and workers do not wear protection devices. 
 
FAIR (level 2): Noise is at an acceptable level in the sense that it is at upper limit of the 
OSHA standards or other regulatory requirements for permissible exposure. The 
workplace is partially adapted to noise and workers wear protection devices only on rare 
occasions. 
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AVERAGE (level 3): Noise is at an acceptable level in the sense that it is within the 
OSHA standards or other requirements, and it is only in few sections that it causes 
annoyance and discomfort. The workplace is in general well adapted to noise and workers 
wear the required protection devices.  
 
GOOD (level 4): Noise is at a very good level and can hardly affect task performance. 
Workplace is very well adapted to noise and workers wear the required protections. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, noise conditions are periodically revised to 
check that they still are at an optimal level, despite changes in the process, plant and 
activities. 
 
A22: Vibration 
 
POOR (level 1): Vibration level is very high and it causes discomfort and annoyance while 
performing the task. Vibration levels exceed the permissible exposure levels for health. 
Workplace is not adapted to vibration. Neither the company nor the workers are aware of 
the negative effects of vibration on health or as a cause of errors during task performance. 
 
FAIR (level 2): Vibration is at an acceptable level in the sense that it is at the limit of the 
permissible exposure levels, but it is annoying and discomforting. Operators could be 
induced to making errors due to high vibration level. Workplace is partially adapted for 
vibration, but there is only a vague understanding of the negative effects of vibration on 
health or as a cause of errors during task performance. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): Vibration is at an acceptable level in the sense that it is within 
permissible exposure levels, and it is only in rare occasions that it causes annoyance and 
discomfort. Workplace is in general well adapted to vibration and there is a good 
understanding of the negative effects of vibration on health or as a cause of errors during 
task performance. 
 
GOOD (level 4): Vibration levels are very low, and therefore chances for inducing errors 
during task performance or damaging health are low. Workplace is very well adapted for 
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vibration and there is a high awareness of the negative effects of vibration on health or as 
a cause of errors during task performance . 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, vibration conditions are periodically revised 
to check that they still are at an optimal level, despite changes in the process, plant and 
activities. 
 
A23: Toxicity and air quality 
 
POOR (level 1): Air quality is evidently very bad. It ma sometimes happen, that workers 
have to stop working because of the bad air quality levels and they strongly complain 
about air quality conditions. Workplace has not got devices to improve the air quality. 
 
FAIR (level 2): Air quality is at an acceptable level in the sense, but it still causes slight 
discomfort. Workers rarely have to stop working because of bad air quality levels, but they 
complain about inadequate air quality conditions. Workplace has got ventilation system, 
but it is definitely not good enough. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): Air quality is at an acceptable level and only in rare occasions does it 
causes discomfort. Workers do not have to stop working because of inadequate air quality 
levels, but they still sometimes complain about the air quality conditions. Ventilation is in 
general good at the workplace. 
 
GOOD (level 4): Air quality is at a very good level and operators feel comfortable to work 
under these air quality conditions. Ventilation is very good. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, air quality conditions are periodically 
revised to check that they still are at an optimal level, despite changes in the process, plant 
and activities. 
A24: Facility layout 
 
POOR (level 1): Facility layout is in general very poor. The design or construction has not 
taken into consideration the risk during operations, inspection, testing, maintenance, 
modification, repair and replacement. High risk equipment and processes are located close 
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to storage areas. The escape routes are narrow and insufficient in case of an emergency 
situation. 
 
FAIR (level 2): The process design has taken into consideration risks associated with the 
operations. The layout has followed minimum safety design standards but fails to optimise 
using tools like link analysis. There is some evidence that risky processes have been clearly 
separated. 
  
AVERAGE (level 3): It is evident that the facility layout has considered the risk during 
operations, inspection, testing, maintenance, modification, repair and replacement during 
the design stage. Safety design standards guidelines have been followed. In some cases a 
systematic methods like link analysis have been used.  
 
GOOD (level 4): It is fully evident that apart from regulatory obligations there has been 
application of link and task analysis to optimise on safety and operability. Hazardous 
equipment and process are located in separate areas. The escape routes are sufficient in 
case of emergency situations 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, facility layout is periodically revised to 
check that it is still at an optimal level, and if not study the implementation of changes or 
secondary measures to improve the situation. 
 
A25: Workstation configuration 
 
POOR (level 1): Workstations are evidently not configured to suit operators’ 
characteristics. They are definitely not big enough to allow free movement during task 
performance. 
 
FAIR (level 2): Workstations are configured to some extent according to the PRISM 
guidelines, but do not take into consideration the majority of workers. Operators can easily 
manoeuvre around when performing their normal tasks but would experience some 
difficulties during emergency conditions. 
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AVERAGE (level 3): There is evidence that the workstations are configured to follow 
PRISM guidelines and other standards for workstation configuration but this has not been 
yet standardised as the across the plant. There is an effort to improve the current general 
conditions. 
 
GOOD (level 4): Workstations are configured to follow PRISM guidelines and other 
standards for workstation configuration. It is evidently visible that the whole plant has 
been standardised and the areas that may need improvement are identified. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, workstation configuration is periodically 
revised to check that it still is at an optimal level, and if not study the implementation of 
changes or secondary measures to improve the situation. 
 
A26: Accessibility 
 
POOR (level 1): It is very often that people have difficulties to reach required equipment, 
visual displays and controls and parts of the plant during operations, inspections, and 
maintenance and or repair operations. Cranes or people wearing clothing and tools 
required to work have difficulties to access some of the required parts of the plant. 
Pathways are not free of obstructions or hanging objects or/and they do not allow the 
shortest way without needing to disconnect or move other machinery. Emergency 
pathways are not clearly marked.  
 
FAIR (level 2): People are able to access many of the required work interfaces even with 
personal protective equipment but with some difficulties. Pathways are mainly free of 
obstructions or hanging objects, but they do not always allow the shortest way without 
having to disconnect or move other machinery. Emergency pathways are mainly clearly 
marked.  
 
AVERAGE (level 3): There is evidence that people can easily reach required equipment, 
visual displays and controls and parts of the plant during operations, inspections, 
maintenance and or repair operations. Cranes or people wearing PPE can access the 
required parts of the plant without difficulties. Pathways are free of obstructions or 
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hanging objects, but they almost always allow the shortest way without needing to 
disconnect or move other machinery. Emergency pathways are clearly marked.  
 
GOOD (level 4): Accessibility design has fulfilled the best practice because all the work 
interfaces can easily be accessed even during emergency situations. Cranes or people 
wearing PPE can access the required parts of the plant without difficulties. Pathways are 
free of obstructions or hanging objects and they allow the shortest way without needing to 
disconnect or move other machinery. Emergency pathways are clearly marked.  
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, accessibility is periodically revised to check 
that it is still at an optimal level, despite possible changes in the process and facility layout, 
and if not study the implementation of changes or secondary measures to improve the 
situation. 
 
A27: Control room design 
 
POOR (level 1): Control room is located in a hazardous place within the plant. Equipment 
in the control room has not been arranged considering the operators’ functions and their 
interactions with equipment. Visibility is partially hindered by consoles or equipment. It is 
frequent to see non-essential personnel in the main working areas. Illumination is not 
adjustable and glare occurs at some parts of the day or in some parts of the room. The 
communication system is hard to access from the primary working areas. Noise level is 
discomforting and annoying and it negatively affects the work performance in the control 
room as well as the communication with outside the control room.  
 
FAIR (level 2): Control room is located in a less hazardous place. Equipment in the 
control room has been partially arranged considering the operators’ functions and their 
interactions with equipment but this has not been done systematically. Non-essential 
personnel are sometimes seen in the main working areas. At seated position the operator is 
facing the visual display board. The communication system is easy to access from the 
primary working areas. Noise level is within the standards, but it is still discomforting and 
annoying and it sometimes affects communication with outside the control room.  
 
Integrating Human Factors into Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis                                           136 
AVERAGE (level 3): Control room is located in a less hazardous place. Equipment in the 
control room has been arranged considering the operators’ functions and their interactions 
with equipment. Visibility is rarely hindered. Non-essential personnel are rarely seen in the 
main working areas. At seated position the operator is facing the visual display board. 
Illumination is adjustable and glare occurs very rarely. The communication system is easy 
to access from the primary working areas. Control room is fairly quite.  
 
GOOD (level 4): Control room is located at a very safe place where it would rarely be 
affected in case of an accident. Equipment in the control room has been arranged 
considering the operators’ functions and their interactions with equipment and this has 
been done by use of link analysis. The good design of the control room allows 
simultaneous access for operator and maintenance team. When seated the operator is 
facing the visual display board. Illumination is indirect, adjustable and glare does not occur. 
The communication system is easy to access from the primary working areas. Noise level 
and air quality are very good. Reference materials are easy to find and use in the control 
room, and employees are also encouraged to use them. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, revision and evaluation of control room are 
done periodically to check if the control room is still at an optimal level, despite possible 
changes in the process, equipment and plant activities, and if not study the implementation 
of changes or secondary measures to improve the situation. 
 
A28: Skills and knowledge 
 
POOR (level 1): It is evident that task requirements are deeply mismatched with the 
operators’ skills. Operators’ skills and knowledge are not sufficient to allow correct task 
performance. Operators do not possess the required qualifications to perform the task that 
has been assigned to them. 
 
FAIR (level 2): Some training has been done to improve operator’s skills and knowledge, 
but there is still a mismatch between the task requirements and the employees’ abilities. An 
improvement in operators’ skills and knowledge would allow a better task performance. 
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AVERAGE (level 3): Apart from training there is an effort to assign only experienced 
operators to complex tasks. Operator’s skills and knowledge are analysed before assigning 
a specific task. 
 
GOOD (level 4): It is within the company’s policies that operators’ skills are matched to 
the task. Experience is considered very important and training is used as a means to 
improve this. 
  
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, skills and knowledge are periodically revised 
to check that they are still at an optimal level, and if not study the implementation of 
changes or secondary measures to improve the situation. 
 
A29: Attention/Motivation 
 
POOR (level 1): Operators cannot concentrate well on conflicting messages. Employees 
are unable to attend an incoming input because they are attending to other inputs. 
Workers do not feel their work as being important and they also have the impression that 
it is not recognised by supervisors, colleagues and/or subordinates. Self reporting is 
avoided because of the blame culture. 
 
FAIR (level 2): There is still an overload due to information provided to the workers. They 
sometimes have problems to deal with an incoming input because they are already 
attending to some other input. Employee satisfaction at and with work can be improved. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): It is only in exceptional cases that operators are overloaded. 
Employees feel their work is recognised by supervisors, colleagues and/or subordinates. 
Employee satisfaction at and with work is acceptable. 
 
GOOD (level 4): The amount of information provided to the workers is optimal such that 
it does not provide overload. Employee satisfaction with and at work is very high. The 
workers are highly motivated and are able to report any obstacles that affect performance 
because it is encouraged. 
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EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, factors that affect attention and motivation 
are periodically revised to check that they still are at an optimal level despite changes in the 
process, equipment and operators’ conditions and if not study the implementation of 
changes or secondary measures to improve the situation. 
 
A30: Fitness for duty 
Fitness for duty is the ability to perform activities within an occupation or function to the 
standards expected in employment (Wright et al., 2002). This refers to matching 
individuals to tasks to ensure an adequate outcome. Individuals should be able to 
successfully undertake the specific tasks and activities to which they are assigned.  
 
POOR (level 1): There is evidence that workers are often fatigued due to long continuous 
working hours without breaks or experience inadequate rest due to long and unplanned 
shifts. Operator could be impaired due to poor health condition or sometime there are 
cases where operator is under influence of alcohol or drugs prior to or during working 
hours. 
 
FAIR (level 2): There is demonstrated effort to regulate shifts in order to reduce fatigue, 
make pauses and control of alcohol and drugs during working hours. Still a lot has to be 
done to integrate this into the company’s policies. 
 
AVERAGE (level 3): There is a systematic planning of breaks and shifts but the 
knowledge of optimal shifts planning is not available. There are still some cases of alcohol 
consumption during working hours. 
 
GOOD (level 4): There is a complete understanding of the effects of long shifts on human 
performance. They are well planned, documented and have become part of the companies 
norms. There is a strict control of alcohol and drugs during working hours. 
 
EXCELLENT (level 5): In addition to level 4, factors affecting fitness for duty are 
periodically revised to check that it is still at an optimal level, despite possible changes in 
the process and staff and if not study the implementation of changes or secondary 
measures to improve the situation. 
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Appendix B 
 
Profession:      
 
Industry:       
 
Years of Experience:      
 
Based on the above classification, how would you rate the following factors according to 
their importance on how they contribute to human error events? 
 
Table B-1: Rating of human factors 
 Least 
important 
Important Moderately 
important 
Highly 
important 
Extremely 
important 
Organisation and management       
Information       
Job Design       
Human System Interface       
Task Environment       
Workplace Design       
Operator Characteristics       
 
And now how would you rate these attributes using the same scale? 
 
Table B-2: Rating of human factors attributes 
Attributes Least 
important 
Important Moderately 
important 
Highly 
important 
Extremely 
important 
Human factors and safety policy      
Organisational culture      
Management of change      
Organisational learning (audit & reviews)      
Line management & supervision      
Training      
Procedures & procedure development      
Communication      
Labels & signs      
Documentation      
Staffing      
Shifts & overtime      
Manual handling.      
Design of controls      
Displays      
Field control panels      
Tools (hand)      
Equipment & valves      
Lighting      
Temperatures       
Noise      
Vibration      
Toxicity      
Facility layout      
Workstation configuration      
Accessibility      
Attention/ motivation      
Fitness for duty      
Skills and knowledge      
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Table B-3: Weights distribution of factors from all the judges 
          Judge                 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23  Mean STD Deviation 
Organisation and management  0.04 0.18 0.35 0.39 0.28 0.05 0.06 0.39 0.33 0.27 0.09 0.20 0.13 0.37 0.03 0.42 0.11 0.25 0.16 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.36  0.21 0.13 
Information 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.27 0.04 0.13 0.16 0.05 0.23 0.29 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.18 0.16 0.14  0.14 0.07 
Job Design  0.18 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.27 0.10 0.38 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.16 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.14  0.13 0.07 
Human System Interface  0.18 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.29 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.24 0.05 0.29 0.25 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.14  0.13 0.07 
Task Environment  0.04 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.27 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.03  0.09 0.07 
Workplace Design  0.40 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.31 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.03 0.24 0.11 0.05 0.25 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.03  0.13 0.09 
Operator Characteristics  0.08 0.38 0.05 0.19 0.29 0.29 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.14 0.34 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.36 0.38 0.18 0.37 0.14  0.18 0.12 
 
 
 
Table B-4: Weights distribution of attributes from all judges 
        Judge                   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23  Mean STD Deviation 
Human factors and safety policy 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.27 0.17 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.29 0.04 0.06 0.50 0.34 0.27 0.35 0.27 0.11 0.20 0.07 0.20  0.17 0.12 
Organisational culture 0.17 0.34 0.34 0.27 0.44 0.43 0.11 0.26 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.06 0.34 0.44 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.20  0.24 0.12 
Management of change 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.50 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.06 0.27 0.14 0.27 0.33 0.20 0.46 0.20  0.20 0.13 
Organisational learning (audit & reviews) 0.17 0.34 0.34 0.09 0.17 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.29 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.20 0.07 0.20  0.16 0.08 
Line management & supervision 0.44 0.13 0.06 0.27 0.17 0.20 0.50 0.03 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.29 0.34 0.17 0.24 0.34 0.27 0.31 0.08 0.33 0.20 0.20 0.20  0.22 0.12 
Training 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.14 0.46 0.33 0.28 0.34 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.23 0.46 0.14 0.09 0.27 0.56 0.09 0.23 0.28 0.46 0.20  0.27 0.12 
Procedures & procedure development 0.14 0.16 0.46 0.14 0.07 0.11 0.28 0.15 0.23 0.09 0.30 0.14 0.08 0.20 0.43 0.21 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.20  0.18 0.11 
Communication 0.14 0.56 0.20 0.43 0.20 0.33 0.28 0.34 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.14 0.23 0.20 0.14 0.45 0.27 0.13 0.27 0.23 0.28 0.20 0.46  0.27 0.11 
Labels & signs 0.43 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.20 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.04 0.14 0.21 0.27 0.13 0.27 0.23 0.05 0.07 0.07  0.14 0.10 
Documentation 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.23 0.27 0.04 0.34 0.23 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.27 0.23 0.11 0.20 0.07  0.14 0.08 
Staffing 0.43 0.43 0.33 0.20 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.71 0.20 0.28 0.20 0.63 0.78 0.33 0.20 0.26 0.63 0.43 0.45 0.20 0.26 0.45  0.38 0.17 
Shifts & overtime 0.43 0.43 0.33 0.20 0.60 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.14 0.60 0.64 0.60 0.11 0.15 0.33 0.60 0.63 0.26 0.43 0.23 0.20 0.63 0.45  0.40 0.17 
Manual handling. 0.14 0.14 0.33 0.60 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.26 0.07 0.33 0.20 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.32 0.60 0.11 0.09  0.23 0.14 
Design of controls 0.23 0.20 0.43 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.17 0.05 0.44 0.20 0.44 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.27 0.14 0.27 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.20  0.22 0.10 
Displays 0.23 0.20 0.14 0.27 0.46 0.12 0.17 0.50 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.34 0.20 0.46 0.27 0.43 0.27 0.36 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.33 0.20  0.26 0.11 
Field Control Panels 0.23 0.20 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.27 0.17 0.25 0.06 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.27 0.14 0.27 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.11 0.33 0.20  0.18 0.07 
Tools (hand) 0.08 0.20 0.14 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.44 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.04 0.34 0.20 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.36 0.20 0.44 0.33 0.11 0.20  0.20 0.11 
Equipment & valves 0.23 0.20 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.20 0.17 0.33 0.11 0.20  0.14 0.07 
Lighting 0.23 0.11 0.33 0.43 0.33 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.33 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.33 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.20  0.19 0.10 
Temperatures 0.23 0.11 0.33 0.14 0.33 0.27 0.35 0.03 0.36 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.20  0.19 0.09 
Noise 0.23 0.33 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.27 0.13 0.22 0.06 0.11 0.36 0.11 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.37 0.11 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.36 0.20  0.19 0.09 
Vibration 0.23 0.33 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.27 0.10 0.22 0.06 0.11 0.36 0.11 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.11 0.23 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.36 0.20  0.18 0.09 
Toxicity 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.35 0.47 0.36 0.56 0.04 0.33 0.46 0.20 0.20 0.06 0.33 0.08 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.06 0.20  0.25 0.16 
Facility Layout 0.13 0.50 0.25 0.17 0.38 0.30 0.17 0.52 0.25 0.30 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.10 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.30 0.50  0.25 0.13 
Workstation configuration 0.38 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.30 0.17 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.39 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.10 0.17 0.30 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.30 0.17  0.24 0.08 
Accessibility 0.13 0.17 0.25 0.50 0.38 0.10 0.50 0.08 0.25 0.10 0.07 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.55 0.50 0.30 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.17  0.27 0.15 
Control Room 0.38 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.30 0.17 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.39 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.10 0.17 0.30 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.30 0.17  0.24 0.08 
Attention/ motivation 0.33 0.47 0.20 0.60 0.64 0.11 0.63 0.45 0.43 0.20 0.43 0.14 0.45 0.43 0.14 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.43  0.42 0.17 
Fitness for duty 0.33 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.43 0.09 0.14 0.43 0.20 0.26 0.11 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.14 0.43  0.21 0.11 
Skills and knowledge 0.33 0.47 0.60 0.20 0.28 0.63 0.26 0.45 0.43 0.60 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.20 0.11 0.26 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.14  0.37 0.14 
  
